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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
PROJECT GOAL 
 
The goal of this research project was to provide earthquake loss estimates for two test 
communities, Carbondale, IL, and Sikeston, MO, using readily available methods.  The 
results must be in a form usable by each community, and the methods must be feasible 
for use by other similar communities.  
 
This project fits into a larger MAE Center program to evaluate and improve earthquake 
safety of essential facilities (hospitals, schools, fire stations, police stations) in Mid-
America. 
 
With a focus on essential facilities, we estimate two categories of loss: 
 
· Direct losses to essential facilities. 
 
· Post-earthquake demands on essential facilities, based on community-wide losses 
and casualties. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The primary objective was to tests the applicability of readily available loss estimation 
tools – specifically, ATC-21 and HAZUS – for providing earthquake loss estimates in 
typical Mid-America communities.  It includes several related research questions: 
 
1. Questions regarding use of HAZUS: 
 
a. How easy is HAZUS to use?  What are the hardware, software, and 
operator requirements?  How appropriate is it for use by communities in 
Mid-America? 
 
b. Does HAZUS give plausible results? (It has not yet been tested in this part 
of the country). 
 
c. How sensitive is HAZUS to the inputs of vulnerability and hazard? 
 
2. Questions regarding integration of ATC-21 inventories with HAZUS: 
 
a. How feasible is it to integrate ATC-21 inventories into HAZUS?  How can 
HAZUS best reflect the intelligence gained by doing local ATC-21 
surveys? 
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b. How does the ATC-21 information change the output of HAZUS, as 
compared to using default data only?  What is the value added by 
augmenting HAZUS with ATC-21? 
 
3. Questions regarding the characteristics of seismic risk in Mid-America: 
 
a. What are the expected earthquake effects in each community?  What is the 
estimated direct damage to essential facilities?  What are the expected 
community demands on essential facilities? 
 
b. How are the damages and casualties distributed across the community? 
What is the effect of structure type?  Functions?  Occupancies?  What are 
the priority candidates for retrofit or replacement? 
 
APPROACH 
 
Earthquake loss estimation requires the following elements: 
 
1. Hazard 
 
In order to estimate the effects of earthquake shaking, one must first specify the 
expected shaking levels, as well as their probability of occurrence.  
Accomplishing this requires identification of potential earthquake source zones 
and the probabilities of their generating earthquakes of various magnitudes.  It 
then requires a model that estimates ground shaking as a function of earthquake 
magnitude, depth, fault mechanism, and distance from the hypocenter (these are 
called ground-shaking attenuation functions).  We specified the earthquake 
sources and probabilities, and depended on the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s (FEMA) HAZUS software (National Institute of Building Sciences, 
1999a and 1999b) to predict the resultant earthquake shaking in Carbondale and 
Sikeston. 
 
In consultation with MAE Center seismologists, we assumed the following set of 
earthquakes affecting Carbondale and Sikeston: 
 
· Moment magnitude M 8.0 and M 7.0 events, evenly spaced along the axis 
of the New Madrid seismic zone. 
 
· M 6.0, 5.5, and 5.0 events occurring anyplace in the region.  We use a suite 
of events located at varying distances from each city: 0 km, 10 km, 25 km, 
50 km, and 100 km. 
 
2.  Vulnerability 
 
Vulnerability describes the people and structures at risk.  Ideally, it requires 
inventory of the building stock and occupants for at least the following 
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characteristics: building height and floor area, structure type, building age, current 
and replacement value of building and contents, location, foundation type, and 
number of building occupants. 
 
We address vulnerability in two ways: by using default information in HAZUS, 
and by augmenting it with a rapid visual screening (ATC-21) (Applied 
Technology Council, 1988) survey of significant buildings.  The ATC-21 survey 
provides information on structure type, size, location, approximate age, and ATC-
21 Final Score.  We surveyed the following buildings in Carbondale and Sikeston: 
 
Essential facilities 
  Other public facilities (city hall, library, etc.) 
Public assembly and other high-occupancy structures (theaters,churches, 
etc.) 
  Large multifamily buildings, hotels, dormitories 
  Health clinics, nursing homes 
  Large (> 5,000 sf) commercial structures 
 
The ATC-21 data provides the basis for estimating replacement costs, based on 
standard construction costs in the area.  In addition, county assessor data provides 
information regarding current value of private buildings (does not include non-
taxable public buildings). 
 
3. Geologic conditions 
 
Site conditions can amplify ground-shaking, and, in some cases, can present a 
potential for liquefaction or landsliding.  Detailed geologic maps are not currently 
available for Carbondale or Sikeston, nor does it appear that subsurface conditions 
vary significantly within either city.  According to the regional map by the 
CUSEC State Geologists (CUSEC, 1995), Carbondale is on generally firmer soils, 
whereas Sikeston is on softer soils with higher potential for enhanced ground-
shaking or liquefaction.  For purposes of this analysis, we assumed that both are 
on NEHRP Site Class D, “stiff soils” (Building Seismic Safety Council, 1998, p. 
34), even though Class E, “soft soils,” may well be more appropriate for Sikeston. 
Class D is the default used by HAZUS and the default recommended by the 
NEHRP Provisions when soil properties are unknown.  For the ATC-21 
evaluation, we assumed soil type SL3 (this is based on the 1985 edition of the 
NEHRP provisions), which conservatively assumes soft to medium stiff clays and 
sands. 
 
4. Risk = Hazard + Vulnerability 
 
HAZUS provides this connection. It takes hazard and vulnerability as inputs, and 
estimates the risk.  It calculates the expected effects of a specified earthquake on 
the structures and population of a community.  We can express this as 
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probabilistic risk either by accounting for the probabilities of the scenario 
earthquakes or by using HAZUS to calculate estimated annualized risk. 
 
 
BACKGROUND: CASE STUDY FOCUS ON CARBONDALE AND SIKESTON 
 
Rationale for Case Study Approach 
 
This project is the first in a sequence of studies focused on Carbondale and Sikeston. The 
purpose of focusing on Carbondale and Sikeston is to be able to perform two “deep” 
studies, to complement broader survey research done by others.  Communities are 
complicated.  Earthquake damages affect communities in many ways, and mitigation 
decisions involve trade-offs against other community issues.  In particular, damage to, or 
repair of, essential facilities are integrally related to other community issues.  By focusing 
a variety of studies on selected communities, we can: 
 
· Perform detailed analyses of essential facilities and buildings at risk, and estimate 
potential earthquake effects. 
 
· Identify potential mitigation actions and evaluate how they compare to other 
community priorities. 
 
· Determine the willingness of key actors, in a representative community, to act in 
the fact of tangible risk information. 
 
The long-term intent is to (1) describe the risk, (2) identify key actors and organizations 
and their concerns, (3) identify possible actions, (4) analyze costs and benefits of the 
actions, and (5) work with key players to determine actions that are feasible (technically, 
economically, politically, and socially).  This project focuses on the first task: describe 
the risk. 
 
Research Approach 
 
The intent is to discover lessons that are transferable to other communities in mid-
America. We hope to learn about the communities, about appropriate mitigation 
strategies, and about the effectiveness of existing tools for accomplishing mitigation and 
preparedness goals.  By using existing methods, we take advantage of existing 
investments in user-oriented methods, and we provide for optimal transferability to other 
communities.  As time goes on, the work will be informed by other MAE Center 
research, and work in these communities will help to inform MAE Center researchers of 
important information needed at the local level. 
 
Selection of Communities 
 
We sought two communities, in order to increase our chances of obtaining meaningful, 
transferable results.  Ideally, we hoped to find one community known to be a leader in 
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hazard mitigation, paired with a second willing community with little previous 
experience in this area.  We also sought communities with different vulnerability and 
hazard characteristics, in order to better represent the range of communities in Mid-
America.  Figure 1-1 shows the locations of Carbondale and Sikeston in relation to New 
Madrid area historical seismic activity. 
 
Because a priority was identifying communities that would be willing to work with us, 
we went first through the Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) for 
nominations, then contacted the state emergency management agencies for their approval, 
and the agencies contacted the communities. 
 
Figure 1-1.  Location of Sikeston and Carbondale, with respect to 1811-1974 
seismic activity (base map from Stauder, 1982). 
 
 
Carbondale 
 
Carbondale is located in Jackson County, in southern Illinois.  Its population is 
approximately 26,000, and the population of this mostly rural county is approximately 
61,000.  Carbondale is the home of Southern Illinois University (SIU).  With 19,000 
students, its presence dominates the community.  The University and other educational 
services employ about 40 percent of the total labor force.  
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Carbondale has long been known to be a leader, for communities of its size, in building 
code implementation, and has been concerned about its seismic risk for some time 
(Olshansky, 1998).  For this reason, Carbondale was the first community selected in 
Illinois for FEMA’s Project Impact program. 
 
According to USGS Professional Paper 1527, Seismicity of the United States, 1568-1989 
(Revised) (Stover and Coffman, 1993), 21 earthquakes of magnitudes greater than 4.5 or 
intensity greater than VI are known to have occurred in southern Illinois, in an area 
approximately within 100 km of Carbondale.  A September 1891 earthquake near Mt. 
Vernon, approximately 40 miles to the northeast, was estimated at body-wave magnitude 
5.8 and toppled several chimneys in Mt. Vernon. The intensity at Carbondale was 
estimated at VI-VII. In November 1968 a magnitude (body-wave) 5.5 earthquake, 
centered approximately 40 miles northeast of Carbondale, affected a wide area of 
southern Illinois.  Carbondale was affected by shaking of intensity VI to VII.  According 
to the 1996 USGS seismic hazard maps for the Central and Eastern United States, 
Carbondale has a 10% probability of experiencing ground shaking of .15 to .20 g or 
greater in 50 years (Figure 1-2). 
 
 
Figure 1-2.  Location of Carbondale and Sikeston with respect to USGS 10% in 
50-year pga map (USGS, 1996) 
 
Sikeston 
 
Sikeston is a city of approximately 18,000 people, mostly in Scott County, Missouri (a 
small part of the city is in neighboring New Madrid County). Located at the junction of 
Interstate Highways 55 and 57, and the intersection of the Union Pacific and Burlington 
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Northern railways, Sikeston is a center of retail services and manufacturing, within an 
agricultural region.  
 
Sikeston is not known for being particularly active in earthquake preparedness, but they 
are aware of their risk and willing to consider actions to improve their preparedness. 
Thus, they may be representative of many communities in Mid-America. 
 
Located in the Bootheel region of Missouri, Sikeston is quite close to the New Madrid 
seismic zone. According to Seismicity of the United States, 1568-1989 (Revised), 16 
earthquakes of magnitudes greater than 4.5 or intensity greater than VI are known to have 
occurred in the Bootheel region, in an area approximately within 50 km of Sikeston. 
More importantly, Sikeston is located at the northern terminus of the New Madrid 
seismic zone. An 1895 earthquake near Charleston (approximately 12 miles east of 
Sikeston) caused shaking of intensity VII to VIII in the vicinity of Sikeston, as well as 
many occurrences of liquefaction and sand blows in the area.  According to the 1996 
USGS seismic hazard maps for the Central and Eastern United States, Sikeston has a 
10% probability of experiencing ground shaking of .20 to .25g or greater in 50 years 
(Figure 1-2). 
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CHAPTER 2 
RAPID VISUAL SCREENING (ATC-21) SURVEYS IN CARBONDALE AND 
SIKESTON 
 
RAPID VISUAL SCREENING (ATC-21) METHOD 
 
Rapid Visual Screening is a method of quickly determining the seismic safety 
characteristics of a building.  The method, developed by FEMA and the Applied 
Technology Council (ATC)is described in two volumes published by FEMA in 1988: A 
Handbook (Applied Technology Council, 1988a), and Supporting Documentation 
(Applied Technology Council, 1988b). It is commonly referred to as “ATC-21" from its 
ATC publication number.   
 
The Rapid Screening Procedure is performed via a sidewalk survey of the building.  The 
Handbook provides the inspector with background information and data required to 
complete a standard Data Collection Form (Appendix B).   The inspector determines a 
Basic Structural Hazard score, then adds or subtracts Performance Modification Factors, 
based on observed seismic-related defects.  The result is a final Structural Score value, S, 
of about -1 to about +6, with higher S scores corresponding to better seismic 
performance.  The result is a ranking of surveyed buildings into two categories: those 
with acceptable life safety risk, and those that should be studied further.  The S scores are 
related to the probability of major damage, defined as damage exceeding 60 percent of 
the building value1.  For example, an S score of 1 indicates a probability of major damage 
                                                 
1According to the Manual (p. 53), the “Basic Structural Hazard Score reflects the 
estimated likelihood of a typical building of that category sustaining major damage, given 
its seismic environment (see ATC-21-1, Appendix B, for details).  Major damage means 
that repairs would cost approximately 60 percent of the building’s value (not including 
land or site improvements).  This value of 60 percent was selected because it often results 
in the building being a total economic loss and, more importantly, it is about the 
threshold where life-safety (i.e., building collapse) begins to become a serious hazard.” 
 More specifically, according to Appendix B of the Supporting Documentation (p. 
103), “The Basic Structural Hazard (BSH) is defined for a type or class of building as the 
negative of the logarithm (base 10) of the probability of damage (D) exceeding 60 
percent of building value for a specified NEHRP Effective Peak Acceleration (EPA) 
loading (reflecting seismic hazard) as: 
BSH = - log10 [Pr(D$60%)]” 
 Furthermore, the same definition holds for the Structural Score S, which is the 
resultant score from adding or subtracting Performance Modification Factors to the BSH.  
That is,  
S = - log10 [Pr(D$60%) 
 What does ATC-21 mean by “given its seismic environment”?  It divides the 
nation into three seismicity areas, based on the 1985 NEHRP map areas (Building 
Seismic Safety Council, 1985): High (areas 5,6,7), Moderate (areas 3,4), and Low (areas 
1,2).  The user selects the appropriate ATC-21 form to complete, based on the area’s 
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of 1 in 10, S=2 corresponds to a probability of 1 in 100, S=3 corresponds to a probability 
of 1 in 1,000, and so on.  If a building has an S score of 2 or less, ATC-21 recommends 
that it be further investigated by a professional engineer experienced in seismic design. 2  
We used this information to devise an additional way of evaluating the seismic risk to a 
building, given its seismic environment.  If 10-S equals the probability of major damage, 
then 10-S times the building floor area gives some indication of the amount of floor area 
likely to be subject to major damage; this is a way to weight the damage probability by 
the size of the building.  Although this value does not have a specific meaning, it is a 
useful relative indicator of damage potential, and it can indicate the approximate 
proportion of the building stock that is at risk.  We call this quantity the “risk floor area.” 
 
It is important to understand the strengths and limitations of this method.  Its strength is 
that it can be done quickly and inexpensively, allowing a community to develop a list of 
potentially hazardous buildings.  The weakness is that it does not substitute for a detailed 
engineering analysis.  It is meant to be an initial screening.  The goal is to broadly 
identify most of the potentially seismically hazardous buildings, at a relatively modest 
expenditure of time and effort.  A more detailed inspection and analysis is needed in 
order to determine an individual building's actual degree of life-safety hazard.  
 
The method is designed for all common building types.  The ATC-21 manual specifically 
addresses the following building types: 
 
  W Wood buildings of all types 
  S1 Steel moment resisting frames 
  S2 Braced steel frames 
  S3 Light metal buildings 
  S4 Steel frames with cast- in-place concrete shear walls 
  C1 Concrete moment resisting frames 
  C2 Concrete shear wall buildings 
  C3/S5 Concrete or steel frame, with unreinforced masonry infill walls 
  TU Tilt-up buildings 
  PC2 Precast concrete frame buildings 
  RM Reinforced masonry 
                                                                                                                                                 
seismicity. According to the maps included in ATC-21, Carbondale is in a Moderate area, 
whereas Sikeston is High (Appendix C). 
2  “...present design practice is such that an S of about 3 is appropriate for day-to-day 
loadings, and a value of about 2 or somewhat less is appropriate for infrequent but 
possible earthquake loadings. Thus, until and unless a community considers the cost-
benefit aspects of seismic safety for itself, an S of about 2.0 is a reasonable preliminary 
value to use within the context the RSP to differentiate adequate buildings from those 
potentially inadequate and thus requiring detailed review.  Use of a higher cut-off S 
implies greater desired safety but increased costs; use of a lower value of S equates to 
increased seismic risk and a lower short-term cost (prior to an earthquake).” (ATC, 1988, 
p. 151). 
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  URM Unreinforced masonry 
 
The Handbook then describes methods for determining:   
 
  Number of stories and total floor area 
  Age of building 
  Use type 
  Occupancy 
  Non-structural falling hazards 
  Type of structure 
  Modifiers: 
   Poor maintenance 
   Vertical irregularity 
   Soft story 
   Torsion 
   Plan irregularity 
   Pounding 
   Large heavy cladding 
   Short columns 
   Benchmark year for seismic design 
   Soil profile 
 
To account for expected seismicity of the area, the surveyor selects one of three basic 
data forms to use, depending on whether the location is in a low, medium, or high 
seismicity region, according to maps in the Handbook. 
 
 
USE OF ATC-21 BY LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
 
Local building officials and emergency service personnel can learn to survey buildings in 
their communities.  In 1991, the Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium contracted with 
EQE Engineering and Design to conduct a pilot training program in ATC-21 Rapid 
Visual Screening.  The purpose was to test the feasibility of teaching non-engineers the 
ATC-21 method, in order to use local government agencies for rapid, low-cost 
earthquake building hazard surveys.  Approximately 30 local officials from the Central 
U.S. attended a two-day training seminar, and practiced the method on nearby buildings.  
Officials were primarily personnel from city building, fire, police, and other emergency 
service departments. Following the training, participants from Evansville, Indiana, and 
Cape Girardeau, Missouri, then evaluated 162 buildings in their own communities.   
 
A licensed Structural Engineer then visited the two cities and checked 32 of the 
assessments in each city. The purpose was to verify the adequacy of the pilot training 
program.  The Structural Engineer and the surveyors agreed on 27 out of the 32 forms in 
Cape Girardeau and 31 of the 32 forms in Evansville. 
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This test was successful.  Conclusions included: 
 
   1. Local officials can effectively learn the ATC-21 method in a two-day 
seminar. 
 
   2. The method requires 30 minutes or less per building. 
 
   3. Based on the limited sample, the method results in assessments 
sufficiently accurate for initial screening. 
 
The Central U.S. pilot training program showed that local officials can employ the ATC-
21 method with fairly good accuracy.  The seminar provided them with adequate tools 
and knowledge to accurately screen dozens of buildings per day per person.   
 
As a result of the pilot program, the project managers estimated that the typical building 
department of a typical town of 10,000 people can screen all critical facilities in their 
jurisdiction within a day, all their commercial buildings within a few days, and could 
make judgments regarding the seismic vulnerability of the housing stock within a few 
days.  Thus, most towns can screen their buildings, using existing personnel, in a 
relatively small amount of time.  With two days of training, and several days of 
surveying, existing staff can screen all the buildings in a town.  If preferred, the screening 
can be performed over several weeks or months, squeezed in as time is available. 
 
 
INSPECTOR TRAINING AND RELIABILITY OF ATC-21 
 
The ATC-21 method has inherent limitations because it is based on visual survey of the 
building, and often only the exterior of the building.  For this reason, a low Structural 
Score, S, should not be construed as a final verdict on the building, but only a suggestion 
“that the building requires additional study by a professional engineer experienced in 
seismic design” (ATC, 1988, p. 1).  Furthermore, this means that the data are most 
usefully viewed in aggregate.  For this reason, we do not publish the individual building 
survey results but only summaries of the inventories. 
 
Although the ATC-21 manual states that it is suitable for use by any interested people (so 
long as they are trained by a professional engineer experienced in seismic design), we 
chose to use only graduate students with undergraduate degrees in architecture or civil 
engineering.  This would ensure a minimal level of skills in building design, and would 
also ensure that our inspectors have a level of expertise consistent with the participants in 
the CUSEC pilot test. Based on the CUSEC pilot tests cited above, we assumed that our 
training goal was to achieve approximately 80 to 90 percent accuracy. 
 
At the University of Illinois, we trained two Urban Planning graduate students, both of 
whom had undergraduate architecture degrees.  They began by reading the ATC-21 
manual, and reviewing training materials from ATC.  They then independently evaluated 
eight buildings on the University of Illinois campus. Following completion of the survey, 
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Professor Mark Aschheim, a MAE Center structural engineer, reviewed each building in 
the field with them.  We then assigned them an additional five buildings on campus, and 
instructed them to survey them together.  Professor Aschheim reviewed their results, and 
we then assigned them an additional five buildings in downtown Champaign, which we 
believed to be more representative of buildings they would see in Carbondale.  By the 
end of the training, we believed that the two students working together would get at least 
80% percent accuracy in identifying buildings requiring additional study (S=? 2). 
 
At Georgia Tech we trained three City Planning graduate students to use the ATC-21 
method.  Two of these students were familiar with the ATC classification scheme from 
earlier work on the SE-1 inventory project.  The students began by reviewing the ATC-21 
training materials on 35mm slides.  They then reviewed the ATC-21 manual.  They pre-
tested the method on a set of buildings in the Atlanta area.  The results of this pretest 
were reviewed with the students before the field work was begun. 
 
FIELD SURVEY METHODS 
 
In Carbondale, we were fortunate to have the results of an ATC-21 survey performed by 
engineering students for the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) in the 
summer of 1992.  They inventoried 121 buildings, as part of a larger effort that covered 
21 counties in southern Illinois.3   We acquired their data for Carbondale, and designed 
our data collection method and database to be compatible with theirs.  Our field manual, 
which consists of introductory instructions followed by IEMA’s coding instructions, is 
included in Appendix A. 
 
We surveyed buildings according to the following priority categories: 
 
1. Essential facilities, residential buildings of 10 dwelling units or more, 
government offices, public utilities, places of public assembly. 
 
2. Health care clinics, commercial structures larger than 5,000 square feet, 
transportation terminals, other public buildings, any other high-occupancy 
buildings. 
 
3. Industrial buildings, warehouses, building supply stores. 
 
The building inspector for the City of Carbondale was instrumental in helping to identify 
building locations, and also provided comments regarding building ages and structural 
types. 
                                                 
3 The purpose of the IEMA inventory is to be able to evaluate buildings that would be 
needed following an earthquake, particularly those buildings that might be suitable for 
emergency shelters.  IEMA’s  intent is to be able to use this list to be able to rapidly make 
informed decisions following a serious earthquake. IEMA conducted the survey over 
several summers, using engineering and architecture students, under direction of a 
structural engineer at IEMA. 
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The two surveyors spent approximately 12 days in the field over four visits to Carbondale 
late in the Fall Semester of 1998.  They briefly confirmed the 121 buildings in the IEMA 
survey (116 still existed with usable information), and then surveyed an additional 179, 
for a total inventory of 295 buildings.  The data collection includes a digital photo library, 
with two photographs showing all sides of each building. It also includes geographic 
coordinates of each building, obtained in the field with a GPS device. We also have a 
digital collection of the scanned images of the 179 new ATC-21 survey forms.  All the 
databases image collections are available to other MAE Center researchers, as long as 
they do not release the survey results for individual buildings. 
 
Three students made two data collection field trips to Sikeston, Missouri in the winter 
and spring of 1999.  The team began by meeting with the City Manager and Building 
Inspector, who were quite helpful in providing insights on the local building stock.  The 
team surveyed 124 buildings using the ATC-21 method.  A follow-up trip in the spring of 
2000 filled in missing data from the first trips. 
 
We also added estimates of building replacement costs to our database.  In order to have 
estimates that reflect local conditions in Carbondale and Sikeston, we asked the 
Carbondale Building Inspector to obtain cost estimates from a reliable local construction 
company. J&L Robinson Construction provided estimated building replacement costs per 
square foot, in 1999 dollars. These ranged from $46/sf to $95/sf.   
 
 
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
 
We surveyed 16 essential facility structures in Carbondale (10 of these were performed 
by IEMA in 1992, and six by us).  These included one hospital, 12 public and private 
schools, one police station, and three fire stations. 
 
Table 2-1 
Essential Facilities, Carbondale 
NAME ADDRESS AGE STORIES 
Carbondale Memorial Hospital 404 W. Main St. 1950's 4.0 
    
Carbondale Central High School 200 N. Springer St. 1920's 3.0 
Lakeland School 925 S. Giant City Rd. 1950's 1.0 
Thomas School 1025 N. Wall St. 1950's 1.0 
Lewis School 801 S. Lewis Lane 1960's 1.0 
Lincoln Junior High School 501 S. Washington St. 1940's 2.0 
Winkler School 1218 W. Freeman St. 1950's 2.0 
Parrish Elementary School 121 N. Parrish Lane 1960's 1.0 
Carbondale East High School 1301 E. Walnut St. 1960's 1.0 
Carbondale New School 1302 Pleasanthill  1920's 1.0 
Admiral Child Development Center 312 S. Wall 1980's 1.0 
Brehm Preparatory School 1245 E. Grand Ave 1950's 2.0 
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Westown Center 2001, 2015, 2102 w. 1980's 1.0 
    
Carbondale Police Dept. 610 E. College St. 1960's 3.0 
    
Carbondale Fire Dept. 300 S. Oakland St. 1960's 1.0 
Carbondale Fire Dept 600 E. College 1970's 1.0 
Carbondale Township Fire Dept 1125 E. Park 1960's 1.0 
 
 
Virtually all the buildings were constructed prior to the advent of seismic building codes 
in this part of the country.  Of the 16 buildings, 10 of them scored less than 2.0, which 
means that they should be inspected by a qualified structural engineer4.  The only 
buildings that received scores higher than 2.0 were four private wood-frame schools.  The 
mean score of the 16 buildings was 1.6.  Another way of looking at it is to compute the 
“risk floor area” (see p. 2-2).  This totals 175,000 sf out of the approximate 615,000 sf in 
these 16 buildings. This means that, according to the ATC-21 survey, about 28% of the 
total floor area of these buildings is at risk of major earthquake damage, given 
Carbondale’s location in a Moderate seismic hazard zone.  In contrast, the Carbondale 
City Hall, a 26,000 square-foot, steel- frame structure built in the 1990s, was constructed 
to modern seismic standards, and received an ATC-21 rating of 5.0 (“risk floor area” 
equals 0.3 sf). 
 
Many of these buildings were subsequently inspected in December, 2000 by several 
MAE Center structural engineering professors: Y.K. Wen, Don White, Joe Bracci, and 
Roberto Leon. Their observations were applied to for several projects under the MAE 
Center’s Essential Facilities Program. 
 
In Sikeston, we surveyed 31 structures at 21 essential facility sites.  These included one 
medical center, one clinic, 14 schools, one police station, one public works facility, and 
three fire stations. 
 
Table 2-2 
Essential Facilities, Sikeston 
NAME ADDRESS AGE STORIES 
Ferguson Medical Clinic 1012 US Hwy 61  2 
Missouri Delta Medical Center (1 of 3 1008 US Hwy 61 1944 2 
Missouri Delta Medical Center (2 of 3 1008 US Hwy 61 1968 3 
Missouri Delta Medical Center (3 of 3 1008 US Hwy 61 1998 2 
    
Lee Hunter Elementary School 300 Baker Ln  1 
Matthews Elementary Courtney & Elm 1955 1 
New Dawn State School 710 Glen Dr  1 
                                                 
4 We do not report individual ATC-21 scores for each building, because of the approximate nature of this 
survey method.  Because the method is 80% accurate, up to 20% of the scores may be incorrect.  Therefore, 
only aggregate scores and analyses are presented in this report. 
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Ralph  T. Bailey School 534 Moore St 1936 2 
SEMO Christian Academy 1440 Ables Rd 1981 1 
Sikeston Area Higher Education Center 101 Kathleen St  1 
Sikeston High School Field House 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Junior High School 100 Twitty Dr  1 
Sikeston Kindergarden Center (1 of 2) 1310 Salcedo Rd 1971 1 
Sikeston Kindergarden Center (2 of 2) 1310 Salcedo Rd 1990 1 
Sikeston Middle School 510 Lindenwood St  1 
Sikeston Regional Center 112 Plaza Dr  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (1 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (2 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (3 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (4 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (5 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (6 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (7 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Sikeston Senior High School (8 of 8) 200 Pine St  1 
Southeast Elementary 2300 Ables Rd  1 
Southwest School 835 Murray Ln  1 
    
Police Department(Sikeston) 215 New Madrid St 1931 2 
Public Works Department Complex (1 of 316 West St 1960 1 
    
Fire Station #1 405 Malone Ave 1950 1 
Fire Station #2 506 US Hwy 61 1950 1 
Fire Station #3 2003 Ables Rd 1998 1 
 
 
Of the 31 buildings, 19 scored less than 2.0.  The mean score was 1.4.  In Sikeston we 
calculated 306,000 sf “risk floor area” out of a total of 868,000 sf.  This means that 35% 
of the total floor area of these buildings is at risk of major earthquake damage, given 
Sikeston’s location in a High seismic hazard zone. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF CARBONDALE ATC-21 SURVEY 
 
Summary results of the Carbondale ATC-21 survey are shown in Tables 2-3 and 2-4.  
Remember that, although these are not all the buildings in Carbondale, they are in our 
judgment the largest and most significant buildings in Carbondale.  Figures 2-1and 2-2 
summarize the buildings (and floor area) surveyed, by structure type and occupancy.  
Nearly 70% of the floor area is in residential and educational buildings, which reflects the 
dominance of Southern Illinois University (including dormitories) among the City’s 
larger buildings.  SIU accounts for 61 of the buildings in the inventory, totaling 4.716 
million square feet. 
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Table 2-3 
Building Characteristics by Occupancy, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
 
 No. Bldgs Building Mean:     
O
ccupancy 
 N
um
ber of B
ldgs 
B
ldgs w
ith 
score=2 
Score 
Struct cost 
($1,000s) 
C
ontents cost 
($1,000s) 
Floor area (1,000 
sf) 
T
otal floor area 
(1,000 sf) 
Floor area in 
bldgs =2 
%
 Floor area in 
bldgs =2 
Full cost of bldgs 
=2 ($1,000s) 
Commercial 81 36 2.7 2,729 2,855 33 2,635 1,398 53.0% 238,065 
Educational 58 45 1.6 3,860 5,586 70 4,061 3,222 79.3% 431,613 
Government 19 11 2.3 1,229 1,080 20 380 276 72.6% 29,769 
Industrial 1 1 0.0 1,650 2,475 30 30 30 100.0% 4,125 
Religious  38 21 2.4 394 394 7 273 195 71.3% 21,420 
Residential 98 37 3.1 1,422 710 30 2,948 1,839 62.4% 130,388 
 295 151 2.6 2,116 2,247 35 10,327 6,959 67.4% 855,378 
Note:  Score of =2 means that the building requires further investigation by a structural 
engineer. 
 
 
 
Table 2-4 
Building Characteristics by Structure Type, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
 
 No.Bldgs Building Mean:     
 Structure 
 N
um
ber of B
ldgs 
 B
ldgs w
ith 
score=2 
 Score 
 Struct cost 
($1,000s) 
 C
ontents cost 
($1,000s) 
 Floor area     
(1,000 sf) 
 T
otal floor area 
(1,000 sf) 
 Floor area in 
bldgs =2 
 %
 Floor area in 
bldgs =2 
 Full cost of 
bldgs=2 ($1,000s) 
C1 5 4 1.4 3,387 4,550 62 308 217 70.3% 27,129 
C2 5 3 2.0 7,469 3,856 162 808 586 72.5% 40,406 
C3 47 46 0.7 3,290 4,308 62 2,905 2,900 99.8% 356,595 
PC2 1 1 0.4 12,962 19,443 236 236 236 100.0% 32,405 
RM 43 15 3.0 4,072 4,002 43 1,839 953 51.8% 177,850 
S 26 9 2.9 3,105 3,921 50 1,307 325 24.9% 43,378 
URM 72 72 0.5 1,246 1,207 24 1,736 1,736 100.0% 176,579 
W 96 1 4.8 592 395 12 1,189 8 0.6% 1,038 
 295 151 2.6 2,116 2,247 35 10,327 6,959 67.4% 855,378 
Note:  Score of =2 means that the building requires further investigation by a structural 
engineer. 
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Of the 295 buildings surveyed, 151 of them (51%) have scores less than or equal to 2.0, 
and the mean score is 2.6.  The buildings with scores less than or equal to 2.0 contain an 
estimated $855 million of building and contents value (66% out of a total of $1.287 
billion in the inventory). By floor area, 67% of the floor area of buildings is in buildings 
with scores less than or equal to 2.0.  An alternative way of looking at the vulnerability of 
the inventory is to compute the “risk floor area” (see p. 2-2), which totals 2.875 million 
sf, 28% of the total 10.327 million sf in the inventory. 
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 Figure 2-1 
Number of Buildings by Structure Type and Occupancy, Carbondale ATC-21 
Survey 
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Figure 2-2 
Building Floor Area by Structure Type and Occupancy, Carbondale ATC-21 
Survey 
 
Figures 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6 illustrate the proportion of buildings with low ATC-21 
scores, by occupancy and structure type.  All occupancy categories contain significant 
amounts of low-scoring buildings, whether measured by number of buildings, floor area, 
total amounts, or percents.  The educational category has the greatest amount of floor 
space in low-scoring buildings, and this accounts for 79% of educational floor area. This 
reflects both the high proportion of unreinforced masonry buildings in the public schools, 
as well as the high proportion of concrete-frame buildings at SIU. From Figures 2-5 and 
2-6 it is clear that the most problematic structure types are unreinforced masonry and 
concrete frame.  Almost all buildings constructed of these materials are suspect and 
require detailed inspections by a structural engineer to verify their quality. 
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Figure 2-3 
Number of Buildings by Occupancy Type, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-4 
Floor Area by Occupancy Type, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-5 
Number of Buildings by Structure Type, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-6 
Floor Area by Structure Type, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
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Figures 2-7, 2-8, and 2-9 illustrate the calculations of “risk floor area” applied by 
occupancy and structure type to the Carbondale inventory. One advantage of this measure 
is that it considers the entire range of ATC-21 scores, rather than simply counting 
buildings with scores greater or less than 2.0.  These figures underscore the primary 
seismic safety problem in Carbondale’s building stock: residential and and educational 
buildings constructed of unreinforced masonry and concrete frames. SIU’s 1.444 million 
sf of “risk floor area” accounts for nearly half of the total “risk floor area” in the 
Carbondale inventory. Carbondale’s schools contribute another 93,000 sf. In addition, 
there are a substantial amount of government, residential, and commercial unreinforced 
masonry buildings as well as concrete frame residential buildings. 
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Figure 2-7 
“Risk Floor Area” by Occupancy, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
Note: This is the sum of risk floor area over all buildings.  Risk floor area for a building =  
(building floor area) x 10-S 
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Figure 2-8 
“Risk Floor Area” by Structure Type, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
 
 
C
1
C
2
C
3
P
C
2
R
M
S
1
S
2
S
3
S
4
U
R
M W
COM
EDU
GOV
IND
REL
RES0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
"R
is
k 
F
lo
o
r 
A
re
a"
Structure Type
Occupancy
COM
EDU
GOV
IND
REL
RES
 
 
Figure 2-9 
“Risk Floor Area” by Structure Type and Occupancy, Carbondale ATC-21 Survey 
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ANALYSIS OF SIKESTON ATC-21 SURVEY 
 
Summary results of the Sikeston ATC-21 survey are shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6.  
Figures 2-10 and 2-11 summarize the buildings (and floor area) surveyed, by structure 
type and occupancy.  Nearly 60% of the inventory’s floor area is in industrial and 
commercial buildings. This reflects the manufacturing base of Sikeston’s economy, and 
contrasts with the building occupancies found in Carbondale.  The ten largest buildings 
surveyed–those buildings larger than 80,000 sf–consist of five industrial, three 
commercial, one school, and one apartment building. Most (56%) of the surveyed 
buildings in Sikeston are constructed of reinforced masonry or steel 
 
 
Table 2-5  
Building Characteristics by Occupancy, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
 
 No. Bldgs. Building Mean:     
 O
ccupancy 
 N
um
ber of 
B
ldgs 
 B
ldgs w
ith 
score=2 
  Score 
  Struct cost 
($1,000s) 
  C
ontents cost 
($1,000s) 
  Floor area 
(1,000 sf) 
  T
otal floor 
area (1,000 sf) 
  Floor area in 
bldgs =2 
  %
 Floor area 
in bldgs =2 
  Full cost of 
bldgs =2 
($1,000s) 
 
COM 15 9 1.2 3,008 2,969 55 820 334 40.8% 40,752 
EDU 21 12 1.6 1,387 1,387 25 529 363 68.6% 39,931 
GOV 17 12 1.1 470 574 6 105 76 72.5% 13,439 
IND 19 8 2.7 2,940 4,410 67 1,268 333 26.2% 55,368 
REL 35 22 2.1 509 509 9 325 252 77.6% 27,751 
RES 17 6 2.5 1,662 831 30 514 207 40.3% 17,098 
 124 69 1.9 1,485 1,606 29 3,561 1,566 44.0% 194,338 
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Table 2-6  
Building Characteristics by Structure Type, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
 
 No.Bldgs Building Mean:     
 Structure 
  N
um
ber of 
B
ldgs 
  B
ldgs w
ith 
score=2 
  Score 
  Struct cost 
($1,000s) 
  C
ontents cost 
($1,000s) 
  Floor area 
(1,000 sf) 
  T
otal floor 
area (1,000 sf) 
  Floor area in 
bldgs =2 
  %
 Floor area 
in bldgs =2 
  Full cost of 
bldgs =2 
($1,000s) 
 
C1 2 2 0.9 1,045 1,045 19 38 38 100.0% 4,180 
C3 4 2 1.0 809 809 13 52 36 69.7% 3,974 
PC1 2 2 -0.1 620 899 11 23 23 100.0% 3,037 
RM 46 27 2.1 1,639 1,854 29 1,343 571 42.5% 77,869 
S1 18 6 2.3 1,225 1,158 22 401 115 28.8% 12,587 
S2 1 1 0.9 4,856 4,856 88 88 88 100.0% 9,712 
S3/5 21 9 2.4 1,760 2,334 45 953 169 17.7% 25,132 
URM 17 14 1.0 1,026 1,103 17 284 268 94.3% 34,048 
W 13 6 2.1 1,607 1,021 29 380 258 67.9% 23,800 
 124 69 1.9 1,485 1,606 29 3,561 1,566 44.0% 194,338 
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Figure 2-10 
Number of Buildings by Structure Type and Occupancy, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-11 
Floor Area by Structure Type and Occupancy, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
 
Of the 124 buildings surveyed, 69 of them (56%) have scores less than or equal to 2.0, 
and the mean score is 1.9.  The buildings with scores less than or equal to 2.0 contain an 
estimated $194 million of building and contents value (51% out of a total of $383 million 
in the inventory). By floor area, 44% of the floor area of buildings is in buildings with 
scores less than or equal to 2.0.  An alternative way of looking at the vulnerability of the 
inventory is to compute the “risk floor area”, which totals 573,000 sf, 16% of the total 
3.561 million sf in the inventory. 
 
Figures 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, and 2-15 illustrate the proportion of buildings with low ATC-21 
scores, by occupancy and structure type.  All occupancy categories contain significant 
amounts of low-scoring buildings, whether measured by number of buildings, floor area, 
total amounts, or percents.  The industrial category has the smallest proportion of floor 
space in low-scoring buildings. In contrast, educational, religious, and government 
buildings all have greater than two-thirds of their floor space in low-scoring buildings.   
Figures 2-14 and 2-15 indicate that the most problematic structure types are unreinforced 
and reinforced masonry.  Concrete buildings and braced steel frames are also rated 
poorly, but Sikeston has few such buildings.  Several wood-frame buildings also receive 
low ratings–for their configurations–though most are not substantially lower than 2.0. 
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Figure 2-12 
Number of Buildings by Occupancy, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-13 
Floor Area by Occupancy, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-14  
Number of Buildings by Structure Type, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-15 
Floor Area by Structure Type, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
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Figures 2-16, 2-17, and 2-18 illustrate the calculations of “risk floor area” applied by 
occupancy and structure type to the Sikeston inventory. From these it appears that the 
primary seismic safety problem in Sikeston’s building stock lies in unreinforced masonry 
commercial, government, and educational buildings, and secondarily reinforced masonry 
commercial and religious buildings.  These five categories account for 46% of the total 
risk floor area in the inventory. 
 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
"R
is
k 
F
lo
o
r 
A
re
a"
 (1
,0
00
 s
f)
COM EDU GOV IND REL RES
Occupancy
Risk
Other
 
Figure 2-16 
“Risk Floor Area” by Occupancy, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-17 
“Risk Floor Area” by Structure Type, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
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Figure 2-18 
“Risk Floor Area” by Structure Type and Occupancy, Sikeston ATC-21 Survey 
Occupancy 
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CHAPTER 3 
HAZUS DEFAULT EARTHQUAKE LOSS ESTIMATES  
FOR CARBONDALE AND SIKESTON 
 
We used the HAZUS earthquake loss estimation software (National Institute of Building 
Sciences, 1999a) to estimate the effects of a range of earthquakes that could plausibly 
affect Carbondale and Sikeston 
 
This analysis used HAZUS 99 SR-1.  Note that the various versions of HAZUS (HAZUS 
97, HAZUS 99, HAZUS 99 SR-1) produce slightly different results, particularly in the 
casualty estimates.   
 
The seismicity of the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ) is poorly understood.  This is 
because there have been few earthquakes in historic time, and because this mid-continent 
seismic zone has few analogs elsewhere in the world.  Indeed, it does not seem to be 
large enough to generate a major earthquake, though it did just that in 1811-1812.  At that 
time, it produced at least three large earthquakes generally believe to have moment 
magnitudes of about 8 (Atkinson, et al, 2000).  In addition, two previous events–in 
approximately 1450 and 900 A.D.– caused widespread liquefaction.  The seismic zone 
itself has been well-defined by studies of micro-seismicity since the early 1970s.  It is 
troublesome, however, that moderate earthquakes–which in most seismic models occur 
much more frequently than great earthquakes-- are missing from the historical and 
prehistoric record.  Damaging earthquakes also have occurred in the areas surrounding 
the New Madrid seismic zone, but this dispersed seismicity is not well understood 
(Hamilton and Johnston, 1990) 
 
As the basis of this analysis, we have made the following assumptions regarding the 
seismicity of the NMSZ and surrounding areas.  These assumptions are based upon 
current knowledge of the area (Atkinson, et al, 2000; Hamilton and Johnston, 1990, 
Johnston, 1996; Johnston and Schweig, 1996.), and have been discussed with Arch 
Johnston of the University of Memphis. We think they are reasonable assumptions, based 
on current understanding of Mid-America seismicity.  We assume that the NMSZ is 
capable of generating earthquakes of M7 and M8, as well as smaller magnitude events.  
The surrounding area (which includes Carbondale) is capable of generating earthquakes 
as large as M5 and M6, which can occur anywhere within this region.   
 
To capture the effects of this full range of possible seismic events, we performed HAZUS 
loss estimates for the following set of earthquakes affecting Carbondale and Sikeston: (1) 
moment magnitude M8.0 and M7.0 events evenly spaced along the axis of the New 
Madrid seismic zone, and (2) M6.0, 5.5, and 5.0 events occurring anyplace in the region.  
To represent the latter, we used a suite of events located at varying distances from each 
city: 0 km, 10 km, 25 km, 50 km, and 100 km (Wu 2002).  These earthquake scenarios 
are listed in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 and are depicted in Figure 3-1.  For Sikeston, we also 
thought it important to run a “worst case” event of a M7 and M8 emanating from the 
nearest portion of the axis of the NMSZ.  Fortuitously, one of our M7/8 locations meets 
this criterion, located on the closest part of the axis of the NMSZ, only 34 km from 
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Sikeston.  It is possible, of course, for a large earthquake to occur even closer to Sikeston, 
but the 34 km scenario seems to be the worst case that is most plausible.  
Table 3-1 Carbondale Earthquake Scenarios 
Scenario Moment 
Magnitude 
Longitude Latitude Distance Depth 
M5-1 5 -89.22 37.72 0 km  15 km  
M5-2 5 -89.14 37.67 10 15 
M5-3 5 -89.03 37.59 25 15 
M5-4 5 -89.2  37.27 50 15 
M5-5 5 -89.46 36.86 100 15 
M5.5-1 5.5 -89.22 37.72 0 15 
M5.5-2 5.5 -89.14 37.67 10 15 
M5.5-3 5.5 -89.03 37.59 25 15 
M5.5-4 5.5 -89.2  37.27 50 15 
M5.5-5 5.5 -89.46 36.86 100 15 
M6-1 6 -89.22 37.72 0 15 
M6-2 6 -89.14 37.67 10 15 
M6-3 6 -89.03 37.59 25 15 
M6-4 6 -89.2  37.27 50 15 
M6-5 6 -89.46 36.86 100 15 
M7-1 7.0 -89.26 36.79 116 12 
M7-2 7.0 -89.61 36.37 173 12 
M7-3 7.0 -89.97 35.95 234 12 
M7-4 7.0 -90.32 35.53 295 12 
M8-1 7.0 -89.26 36.79 116 12 
M8-2 7.0 -89.61 36.37 173 12 
M8-3 7.0 -89.97 35.95 234 12 
M8-4 7.0 -90.32 35.53 295 12 
Attenuation function: Project97 East Coast   
 
Table 3-2 Sikeston Earthquake Scenarios 
Scenario Moment 
Magnitude 
Longitude Latitude Distance Depth 
M5-1 5 -89.58 36.88 0 km  15 km  
M5-2 5 -89.51 36.82 10 15 
M5-3 5 -89.41 36.73 25 15 
M5-4 5 -89.24 36.59 50 15 
M5-5 5 -88.9  36.3  100 15 
M5.5-1 5.5 -89.58 36.88 0 15 
M5.5-2 5.5 -89.51 36.82 10 15 
M5.5-3 5.5 -89.41 36.73 25 15 
M5.5-4 5.5 -89.24 36.59 50 15 
M5.5-5 5.5 -88.9  36.3  100 15 
M6-1 6 -89.58 36.88 0 15 
M6-2 6 -89.51 36.82 10 15 
M6-3 6 -89.41 36.73 25 15 
M6-4 6 -89.24 36.59 50 15 
M6-5 6 -88.9  36.3  100 15 
M7-2 7 -89.26 36.79 34 12 
M7-3 7 -89.61 36.37 63 12 
M7-4 7 -89.97 35.95 122 12 
M7-5 7 -90.32 35.53 184 12 
M8-2 8 -89.26 36.79 34 12 
M8-3 8 -89.61 36.37 63 12 
M8-4 8 -89.97 35.95 122 12 
M8-5 8 -90.32 35.53 184 12 
Evaluating Earthquake Risk in Mid-American Communities 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1.  Carbondale (left) and Sikeston (right) earthquake scenarios. 
The blue dots indicate locations of M7 and M8 scenarios, distributed along the New Madrid 
seismic zone (same locations used for both Carbondale and Sikeston).  The red dots indicate 
locations of M5, M5.5, and M6 scenarios, located at distances of 0 km, 10 km, 25 km, 50 km, 
and 100 km from each community.  
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Figure 3-2.  Carbondale and Sikeston Study Areas. 
 
 
 
CARBONDALE 
 
HAZUS study areas are composed of census tracts and counties.  We constructed a 
census tract-based study area to approximate the City of Carbondale.  It consists of eight 
census tracts that encompass and extend beyond the city limits.  The 1990 census 
population of the study area is 33,066, and the population of Carbondale is 27,033.  By 
population the city is 81.7% of the study area. Figure 3-2 shows both the Carbondale and 
Sikeston study areas, and Table 3-3 describes the Carbondale study area. 
 
Table 3-3 Carbondale Study Area 
Tract Total Population of 
Tract (City + County) 
City Residents in 
Tract 
City Residents as % of 
Tract Population 
108 4,108 2,889 70.3% 
109 2,012 1,393 69.2% 
110 5,618 4,256 75.8% 
111 3,479 3,479 100.0% 
112 5,580 5,123 91.8% 
113 6,729 6,717 99.8% 
114 3,204 2,099 65.5% 
115 2,336 1,077 46.1% 
TOTAL 33,066 27,033 81.7% 
 
Carbondale 
Sikeston 
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Default Community-wide Data 
 
In order to estimate effects on the community as a whole, we ran the 23 HAZUS 
scenarios using the default data supplied with the HAZUS software.  The default data 
contains inventories for key individual facilities, such as essential facilities and 
transportation, gathered from nationwide databases. These facilities have specific 
locations on the map.  It also estimates the inventory of general building stock, by 
number of buildings and square footage, for 36 structure types and 28 occupancy classes 
(use types, such as residential, commercial, etc.).  The general building stock data are 
derived from publicly available data and aggregated by census tract.  For analytic 
purposes, we simplified these into 13 general structural classes and seven general 
occupancy classes. Table 3-4 summarizes the default general building stock for 
Carbondale, according to occupancy type. 
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Table 3-4 
General Building Stock, by Occupancy (HAZUS Default) 
Carbondale 
 
Label Occupancy Class Floor Area 
(1,000 sq. 
ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000 
Number of 
Buildings  
RES1 Single family 7,806 501,083 5,204 
RES2 Mobile home 2,417 109,090 2,417 
RES3 Multi Family 5,798 465,231 362 
RES4 Temporary lodging 110 8,920 2 
RES5 Dormitory 4,662 374,080 155 
RES6 Nursing Home 90 6,861 2 
COM1 Retail trade 1,225 62,672 86 
COM2 Wholesale trade 303 10,336 8 
COM3 Personal/repair svcs. 504 34,367 43 
COM4 Financial/Professiona
l 
684 50,098 19 
COM5 Banks 105 12,159 5 
COM6 Hospital 42 5,098 0 
COM7 Medical Office 246 22,179 20 
COM8 Entertainment/Rec. 305 30,867 23 
COM9 Theaters 11 803 0 
COM1
0 
Parking 0 0 0 
IND1 Heavy Industry  265 13,576 5 
IND2 Light 313 16,017 15 
IND3 Food/Drugs/Chem. 5 271 0 
IND4 Metals/Min Process. 0 0 0 
IND5 High Technology 0 0 0 
IND6 Construction 156 7,969 8 
AGRI Agriculture 65 842 4 
REL1 Church 387 33,035 28 
GOV1 General Services 66 4,404 1 
GOV2 Emergency Response 0 0 0 
EDU1 Schools 378 28,063 19 
EDU2 Colleges 501 50,220 21 
 TOTAL 26,443 1,848,239 8,447 
 
 
Table 3-5 summarizes the default general building stock by structure type. 
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Table 3-5 
General Building Stock, by Structure Type (HAZUS Default) 
Carbondale 
 
Label Structure Type  Floor 
Area 
(1,000 sq. 
ft.) 
Dollar Exposure 
($1,000) 
Number of 
Buildings  
W Wood 12,697 909,560 4,390 
S1 Steel Moment Frame 150 10,688 7 
S2 Steel Braced Frame 315 22,744 16 
S3 Steel Light Frame 519 32,633 27 
S4 Steel Frame, Concr. Shear Walls 282 17,799 16 
S5 Steel Frame, URM infill 346 22,174 19 
C1 Concrete Moment Frame 272 21,853 9 
C2 Concrete Shear Walls 1,048 78,950 91 
C3 Concrete Frame, URM infill 114 8,522 2 
PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-up 1,353 102,130 51 
PC2 Precast Frames, Concrete Shear Walls 208 16,121 7 
RM Reinforced Masonry 406 32,030 20 
URM Unreinforced Masonry 6,315 463,943 1,374 
MH Mobile Homes 2,417 109,090 2,417 
TOTAL
L 
 26,443 1,848,239 8,446 
 
 
HAZUS categorizes damage into five damage states: None, Slight, Moderate, Extensive, 
and Complete.  The precise definitions vary by structure type, but the HAZUS manual 
supplies the following graphic to illustrate the damage states: 
 
NONE SLIGHT MODERATE EXTENSIVE COMPLETE
 
Figure 3-3. The Five Damage States in HAZUS (NIBS, 1999a) 
 
For a given level of shaking for each structure type, HAZUS computes the probabilities 
of each damage state.  In other words, for a given stock of buildings, HAZUS estimates 
the proportion that are likely to be in each damage state.  Table 3-6 presents the damage 
state probabilities for the 23 Carbondale earthquake scenarios. 
Evaluating Earthquake Risk in Mid-American Communities 
38 
Table 3-6 
Damage States by Floor Area (Total 26,443,000 sq. ft.), Carbondale 
 
Scenario None  Slight Moderate  Extensive Complete 
M5, 0 km 75.18% 11.73% 6.34% 1.30% 0.00% 
M5, 10 km 79.04% 9.89% 4.93% 0.89% 0.00% 
M5, 25 km 88.29% 4.34% 1.61% 0.00% 0.00% 
M5, 50 km 92.32% 1.79% 0.54% 0.00% 0.00% 
M5, 100 km 94.64% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
M5.5, 0 km 46.38% 21.88% 18.68% 6.41% 1.25% 
M5.5, 10 km 54.13% 19.96% 15.14% 4.64% 0.84% 
M5.5, 25 km 70.04% 14.02% 8.23% 1.95% 0.00% 
M5.5, 50 km 85.88% 5.86% 2.32% 0.11% 0.00% 
M5.5, 100 km 91.43% 2.46% 0.86% 0.00% 0.00% 
M6, 0 km 22.52% 21.59% 29.39% 15.63% 5.59% 
M6, 10 km 28.54% 22.41% 26.98% 12.84% 4.04% 
M6, 25 km 46.04% 21.54% 19.07% 6.82% 1.46% 
M6, 50 km 72.80% 12.93% 7.16% 1.54% 0.00% 
M6, 100 km 86.00% 5.84% 2.32% 0.00% 0.00% 
M7, 116 km 56.86% 18.50% 14.55% 4.27% 0.61% 
M7, 173 km 72.45% 12.95% 7.55% 1.66% 0.00% 
M7, 234 km 83.36% 7.52% 3.29% 0.46% 0.00% 
M7, 295 km 87.70% 4.88% 1.80% 0.00% 0.00% 
M8, 116 km 9.98% 13.32% 25.63% 25.14% 20.63% 
M8, 173 km 20.21% 17.41% 26.61% 20.16% 10.27% 
M8, 234 km 35.82% 18.36% 22.96% 13.18% 4.21% 
M8, 295 km 53.14% 17.07% 16.11% 6.82% 1.52% 
 
 
This analysis begins to indicate which scenarios are of greatest concern to Carbondale.  
Those scenarios with at least 5% of total floor area at least extensively damaged are 
summarized in Table 3-7. 
 
Table 3-7 
Scenarios with Greatest Damage to Building Stock, Carbondale 
Scenario Percent Floor Area With 
Extensive or Complete 
Damage  
M 5.5, 0 km 7.66% 
M 5.5, 10 km 5.48% 
M 6, 0 km 21.22% 
M 6, 10 km 16.88% 
M 6, 25 km 8.28% 
M 8, 116 km 45.79% 
M 8, 173 km 30.43% 
M 8, 234 km 17.39% 
M 8, 295 km 8.34% 
 
Table 3-8 shows the same damage summary, but by number of buildings. 
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Table 3-8 
Damage States by Number of Buildings (Total 8,447), Carbondale 
 
Scenario None  Slight Moderate  Extensive Complete 
M5, 0 km 6,836 1,053 488 56 13 
M5, 10 km 7,210 839 360 36 1 
M5, 25 km 7,918 387 135 6 0 
M5, 50 km 8,272 134 40 0 0 
M5, 100 km 8,446 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 4,067 2,332 1,613 383 51 
M5.5, 10 km 4,882 2,026 1,250 258 30 
M5.5, 25 km 6,358 1,345 654 74 15 
M5.5, 50 km 7,735 523 172 16 0 
M5.5, 100 km 8,147 221 78 0 0 
M6, 0 km 2,011 2,427 2,641 1,081 286 
M6, 10 km 2,708 2,442 2,285 827 184 
M6, 25 km 4,295 2,031 1,417 366 64 
M6, 50 km 6,661 1,152 565 58 10 
M6, 100 km 7,776 510 145 15 0 
M7, 116 km 5,557 1,520 1,094 236 39 
M7, 173 km 6,617 1,117 631 78 3 
M7, 234 km 7,507 665 258 16 0 
M7, 295 km 7,902 408 121 15 0 
M8, 116 km 2,047 1,935 1,897 1,519 1,048 
M8, 173 km 3,202 1,819 1,674 1,222 529 
M8, 234 km 4,549 1,491 1,355 813 238 
M8, 295 km 5,429 1,251 1,134 520 112 
 
 
HAZUS estimates many types of effects on the community.  Several of the HAZUS 
outputs can be used to estimate demand on essential facilities: casualties, fire ignitions, 
and emergency shelter needs.  Tables 3-9, 3-10, and 3-11 present the HAZUS casualty 
estimates for the 23 scenario earthquakes. 
HAZUS classifies casualties into a four-tier scale. Severity 1 injuries require medical aid 
with no hospitalization.  Severity 2 injuries require a greater degree of care and 
hospitalization, but are not life-threatening.  Severity 3 injuries pose an immediate life 
threat if not treated adequately and expeditiously.  Most of these injuries are due to 
structural collapse.  Severity 4 casualties are deaths. 
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Table 3-9 
Casualties by Location, by Time of Day (number of people), Carbondale 
Scenario 2am 2pm 5pm 
 Home Work Commute  Home Work Commute  Home Work Commute  
M5, 0 km 14 1 0 1 33 0 2 15 0 
M5, 10 km 5 0 0 0 11 0 1 5 0 
M5, 25 km 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 
M5, 50 km 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 50 3 0 5 136 0 7 61 1 
M5.5, 10 km 36 2 0 4 83 0 4 37 0 
M5.5, 25 km 17 1 0 2 39 0 2 17 0 
M5.5, 50 km 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 
M5.5, 100 km 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
M6, 0 km 168 9 1 18 441 3 21 196 13 
M6, 10 km 124 7 0 12 324 2 14 144 9 
M6, 25 km 52 3 0 5 142 0 6 63 2 
M6, 50 km 12 1 0 1 32 0 1 14 0 
M6, 100 km 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 
M7, 116 km 22 2 0 2 68 0 3 30 1 
M7, 173 km 7 1 0 1 25 0 1 12 0 
M7, 234 km 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 
M7, 295 km 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 
M8, 116 km 344 30 1 36 1326 3 43 587 14 
M8, 173 km 144 15 0 14 665 2 17 295 7 
M8, 234 km 59 7 0 6 307 1 7 137 3 
M8, 295 km 31 3 0 3 123 0 3 55 2 
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Table 3-10 
Casualties by Severity Classification, by Time of Day, Carbondale 
 
 2:00 AM 2:00 PM 5:00 PM 
Scenario 1  2 3 4 1  2 3 4 1  2 3 4 
M5, 0 km 12 2 0 0 29 5 0 0 14 2 0 0 
M5, 10 km 5 1 0 0 11 1 0 0 5 1 0 0 
M5, 25 km 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
M5, 50 km 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 45 7 1 1 118 19 2 2 57 9 1 1 
M5.5, 10 km 32 5 0 0 74 11 1 1 35 5 1 1 
M5.5, 25 km 15 2 0 0 35 5 0 0 17 2 0 0 
M5.5, 50 km 2 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 
M5.5, 100 km 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
M6, 0 km 147 25 3 3 378 68 9 8 181 35 9 5 
M6, 10 km 109 18 2 2 278 49 6 5 132 25 6 3 
M6, 25 km 46 7 1 1 123 20 2 2 58 10 2 1 
M6, 50 km 11 2 0 0 28 4 0 0 13 2 0 0 
M6, 100 km 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
M7, 116 km 21 3 0 0 59 9 1 1 28 4 1 0 
M7, 173 km 6 1 0 0 22 3 0 0 11 1 0 0 
M7, 234 km 3 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
M7, 295 km 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
M8, 116 km 306 57 6 6 1103 209 27 26 513 100 18 13 
M8, 173 km 132 23 2 2 555 102 13 12 256 49 9 6 
M8, 234 km 55 9 1 1 258 45 5 5 119 22 4 3 
M8, 295 km 29 4 0 0 105 18 2 2 49 9 1 1 
 
 
In all the Carbondale scenarios, daytime casualties exceed nighttime casualties, probably 
reflecting the fact that most residences are of wood-frame construction. 
 
The scenarios that would place the greatest demand on medical services–those that would 
result in at least 30 total casualties– are summarized in Table 3-11.  
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Table 3-11 
Scenarios with Largest Number of Casualties, Carbondale 
Scenario Total 
Casualties, 2 
pm 
Hospitalization 
(Severity 2+3) 
Deaths, 2 
pm 
M 5, 0 km 34 5 0 
M 5.5, 0 km 141 21 2 
M 5.5, 10 km 87 12 1 
M 5.5, 25 km 40 5 0 
M 6, 0 km 463 77 8 
M 6, 10 km 338 55 5 
M 6, 25 km 147 22 2 
M 6, 50 km 32 4 0 
M 7, 116 km 70 10 1 
M 8, 116 km 1,365 236 26 
M 8, 173 km 682 115 12 
M 8, 234 km 313 50 5 
M 8, 295 km 127 20 2 
 
HAZUS runs a simplified model of fire ignition and spread following earthquake 
shaking.  This information can help to estimate the demand that would be placed on 
emergency responders.  The number of ignitions in the model is based on peak ground 
acceleration and square footage of building inventory.  The model also makes 
assumptions regarding fire station location, engine speed, and wind speed and direction.  
The user can modify these parameters, but we chose to use the default values.  Because 
HAZUS models fire by means of simulation, users would obtain different results with 
each HAZUS run. 
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Table 3-12 
Fire Following Earthquake, Carbondale 
Scenario # Of 
Ignitions  
Population 
Exposed 
Value Exposed 
(thous. 1994 $) 
M5, 0 km 2 83 4,358 
M5, 10 km 1 87 4508 
M5, 25 km 1 2 94 
M5, 50 km 0 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 3 77 4,019 
M5.5, 10 km 2 84 4,393 
M5.5, 25 km 2 9 356 
M5.5, 50 km 0 0 0 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 0 
M6, 0 km 5 220 13,409 
M6, 10 km 3 90 4,639 
M6, 25 km 2 88 4,606 
M6, 50 km 1 2 94 
M6, 100 km 0 0 0 
M7, 116 km 1 2 94 
M7, 173 km 0 0 0 
M7, 234 km 0 0 0 
M7, 295 km 0 0 0 
M8, 116 km 2 9 356 
M8, 173 km 2 9 356 
M8, 234 km 0 0 0 
M8, 295 km 0 0 0 
 
 
Nine of the 23 scenarios predict multiple ignitions.  Scenarios that would place the most 
demands on the fire department are those that would threaten more than 75 people and 
more than $3 million of property. Most of these represent more than one fire ignition.  
These scenarios are highlighted in the table.  
 
HAZUS estimates displaced households based on actual damage, as well as on 
assumptions regarding resident perceptions of damage.  All dwelling units in buildings 
that are completely damaged are assumed to be uninhabitable.  In addition, HAZUS 
assumes that residents perceive some moderately damaged buildings and most 
extensively damaged buildings as being uninhabitable. This proportion varies by type of 
occupancy (single-family versus multifamily).  The default data makes no assumptions 
regarding habitability with respect to power loss.  In reality, power loss alone during the 
winter would force many residents to leave their homes. 
 
Some of these displaced residents will require short-term shelter in public facilities.  The 
default data in HAZUS makes assumptions for each census tract regarding proportion of 
displaced persons seeking shelter. These assumptions are based on income level, 
ethnicity, tenure, and age.  Generally, HAZUS assumes that approximately 40% of 
displaced persons will require shelter, but this is highly sensitive to household income. 
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Table 3-13 summarizes estimates of displaced households and shelter needs for the 23 
Carbondale earthquake scenarios. 
 
Table 3-13 
Emergency Shelter Demands, Carbondale 
Scenario Displaced Households  People Requiring Short-
Term Shelter 
M5, 0 km 59 69 
M5, 10 km 30 27 
M5, 25 km 0 0 
M5, 50 km 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 354 400 
M5.5, 10 km 245 296 
M5.5, 25 km 59 69 
M5.5, 50 km 0 0 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 
M6, 0 km 1,023 1,152 
M6, 10 km 757 851 
M6, 25 km 355 405 
M6, 50 km 59 69 
M6, 100 km 0 0 
M7, 116 km 59 69 
M7, 173 km 59 69 
M7, 234 km 0 0 
M7, 295 km 0 0 
M8, 116 km 1,288 1,403 
M8, 173 km 540 597 
M8, 234 km 115 139 
M8, 295 km 59 69 
 
 
Eight of the scenarios are expected to require shelter for over 100 people.  These are 
highlighted above.  If the earthquake occurs in the winter and disrupts power, these 
numbers could be substantially higher. 
 
Finally, a useful way to summarize overall damage to the City of Carbondale for the 23 
earthquake scenarios is by estimating total direct economic loss. By “direct” economic 
loss, we mean all structural and nonstructural loss, as well as all direct costs of economic 
disruption, such as lost wages, rent income, and relocation expenses.  These are 
summarized in Table 3-14, and the total direct loss is depicted in Figure 3-3 according to 
magnitude and distance.  “Indirect” losses, which we do not consider here, would include 
ripple effects through the economy. 
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Table 3-14 
Direct Economic Losses for Buildings (Thousands of 1994 $)5, Carbondale 
Scenario Capital Stock Losses Income Losses Total 
Loss 
 1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6* 7* 8*  
M5, 0 km 4,930 37,825 25,452 277 3,573 886 1,221 2,242 76,406 
M5, 10 km 3,198 27,056 18,335 182 2,238 684 928 1,420 54,041 
M5, 25 km 1,024 7,182 5,053 49 483 145 187 257 14,380 
M5, 50 km 296 743 329 2 110 54 65 62 1,661 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 19,578 99,741 50,840 572 15,696 3,924 5,425 10,497 206,273 
M5.5, 10 km 13,908 70,875 37,614 376 10,965 2,849 3,912 7,491 147,990 
M5.5, 25 km 6,426 29,240 16,311 176 4,541 1,181 1,604 2,934 62,413 
M5.5, 50 km 1,576 4,051 1,905 17 800 232 310 551 9,442 
M5.5, 100 
km 
428 429 127 0 187 86 112 83 1,452 
M6, 0 km 47,732 189,478 80,601 866 34,923 9,209 12,812 24,288 399,909 
M6, 10 km 37,311 146,908 62,567 643 27,542 7,415 10,179 19,154 311,719 
M6, 25 km 18,8040 72,426 33,139 332 14,671 3,978 5,408 9,964 158,722 
M6, 50 km 5,255 15,014 6,952 80 3,819 1,038 1,400 2,352 35,910 
M6, 100 km 1,401 3,013 1,050 15 714 191 252 370 7,006 
M7, 116 km 10,883 25,932 10,995 142 7,470 2,779 3,690 4,403 66,244 
M7, 173 km 4,702 10,692 3,440 42 3,888 1,140 1,539 2,282 27,725 
M7, 234 km 1,989 3,700 1,294 15 1,198 431 569 764 9,960 
M7, 295 km 1,167 1,410 400 3 640 178 239 321 4,358 
M8, 116 km 84,223 196,541 38,977 388 50,847 18,590 25,382 34,964 449,912 
M8, 173 km 51,361 110,460 22,428 257 31,636 12,520 16,969 21,231 266,862 
M8, 234 km 28,242 56,605 12,478 158 17,334 7,737 10,378 10,511 143,447 
M8, 295 km 14,418 25,264 6,093 80 9,549 3,970 5,305 5,238 69,917 
* 1 = Structural Damage; 2 = Non-Structural Damage; 3 = Contents Damage; 4 = 
Inventory Loss; 5 = Relocation Loss; 6 = Capital Related Loss; 7 = Wage Losses; 8 = 
Rental Income Losses 
 
Eight of the scenarios would result in total losses to the community exceeding $100 
million (about $3,000 per person). 
                                                 
5 Our version of HAZUS presented loss estimates in 1994 dollars, which is reflected in all the tables in this 
report.  In some places we also present updated 2001 dollars. 
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Figure 3-3 
Direct Economic Losses, Carbondale Scenarios
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SIKESTON 
 
We used the following census tracts, as the closest approximation to the City of Sikeston: 
 
Table 3-15 
Sikeston Study Area 
Tract Total Population of 
Tract  
(City + County) 
City Residents 
in Tract 
City Residents as % of 
Tract Population 
9805 4,107 4,078 99.3% 
9806 4,930 2,858 58.0% 
9807 3,911 3,911 100.0% 
9808 3,335 3,287 98.6% 
9809 2,775 2,775 100.0% 
9601 4,044 732 18.1% 
TOTALS 23,102 17,641 76.4% 
 
All of the City population is within the HAZUS study area, as well as 5,461 additional 
inhabitants.  City inhabitants represent 76.4% of the population of the HAZUS study 
area. Five of the census tracts are in Scott County, and tract 9601 is in New Madrid 
County. 
 
The default general building stock for Sikeston is summarized in Table 3-16, according to 
occupancy type. 
 
Table 3-16 
General Building Stock, by Occupancy (HAZUS Default), Sikeston 
Label Occupancy Class Floor 
Area 
(1,000 sq. 
ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000 
Number of 
Buildings  
RES1 Single family 10,350 595,498 6900 
RES2 Mobile home 845 34,184 845 
RES3 Multi Family 1,734 124,709 109 
RES4 Temporary lodging 137 9,948 2 
RES5 Dormitory 402 28,947 13 
RES6 Nursing Home 50 3,444 0 
COM1 Retail trade 1,562 71,635 112 
COM2 Wholesale trade 1,028 31,427 30 
COM3 Personal/repair svcs. 553 33,799 47 
COM4 Financial/Professional 1,021 67,031 29 
COM5 Banks 89 9,270 4 
COM6 Hospital 133 14,468 1 
COM7 Medical Office 178 14,402 15 
COM8 Entertainment/Rec. 241 21,909 18 
COM9 Theaters 3 206 0 
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COM10 Parking 0 0 0 
IND1 Heavy Industry  475 21,778 10 
IND2 Light 156 7,149 8 
IND3 Food/Drugs/Chem. 72 3,288 4 
IND4 Metals/Min Process. 130 5,961 8 
IND5 High Technology 0 0 0 
IND6 Construction 244 11,186 14 
AGRI Agriculture 193 2,255 14 
REL1 Church 244 18,663 16 
GOV1 General Services 46 2,780 0 
GOV2 Emergency Response 6 609 1 
EDU1 Schools 611 40,627 30 
EDU2 Colleges 6 494 0 
 TOTAL 20,510 1,175,671 8,230 
 
 
Table 3-17 summarizes the default general building stock by structure type. 
 
Table 3-17 
General Building Stock, by Structure Type (HAZUS Default), Sikeston 
Label Structure Type  Floor Area 
(1,000 sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000) 
Number of 
Buildings  
W Wood 10,815 643,447 5,414 
S1 Steel Moment Frame 175 9,352 7 
S2 Steel Braced Frame 369 20,202 19 
S3 Steel Light Frame 756 38,553 38 
S4 Steel Frame, Concr. Shear Walls 409 20,879 20 
S5 Steel Frame, URM infill 489 24,923 25 
C1 Concrete Moment Frame 100 5,763 3 
C2 Concrete Shear Walls 521 28,727 25 
C3 Concrete Frame, URM infill 54 2,598 1 
PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-up 617 33,003 26 
PC2 Precast Frames, Concrete Shear Walls 65 3,471 1 
RM Reinforced Masonry 40 14,806 13 
URM Unreinforced Masonry 5,053 295,760 1,793 
MH Mobile Homes 845 34,184 845 
TOTAL
L 
 20,510 1,175,671 8,230 
 
 
As with Carbondale, we performed HAZUS loss estimates for the 23 earthquake 
scenarios.  Table 3-18 summarizes the damage states resulting from each scenario. 
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Table 3-18 
Damage States by Floor Area (Total = 20,510 Thous. sq. ft.), Sikeston 
Scenario None  Slight Moderate  Extensive Complete 
M5, 0 km 82.48% 9.60% 4.45% 0.83% 0.00% 
M5, 10 km 85.86% 7.81% 3.21% 0.64% 0.00% 
M5, 25 km 93.40% 2.98% 1.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
M5, 50 km 95.48% 1.57% 0.43% 0.00% 0.00% 
M5, 100 km 97.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
M5.5, 0 km 52.81% 23.12% 16.26% 4.55% 0.81% 
M5.5, 10 km 60.88% 20.26% 12.71% 3.14% 0.33% 
M5.5, 25 km 76.14% 13.17% 6.71% 1.29% 0.05% 
M5.5, 50 km 89.14% 5.74% 2.31% 0.21% 0.00% 
M5.5, 100 km 95.52% 1.69% 0.45% 0.00% 0.00% 
M6, 0 km 30.69% 25.26% 26.64% 11.36% 3.33% 
M6, 10 km 36.24% 25.33% 23.98% 9.36% 2.45% 
M6, 25 km 52.88% 22.36% 16.43% 4.93% 1.02% 
M6, 50 km 75.95% 13.24% 6.76% 1.33% 0.00% 
M6, 100 km 91.14% 4.52% 1.62% 0.00% 0.00% 
M7, 34 km 20.43% 22.95% 29.83% 16.88% 7.45% 
M7, 63 km 44.45% 23.26% 20.50% 7.60% 1.88% 
M7, 122 km 70.38% 15.52% 9.31% 2.19% 0.00% 
M7, 184 km 83.24% 9.50% 4.29% 0.81% 0.00% 
M8, 34 km 2.76% 9.52% 24.14% 24.31% 36.71% 
M8, 63 km 9.62% 16.45% 27.95% 22.64% 21.00% 
M8, 122 km 22.14% 20.64% 26.86% 17.50% 10.38% 
M8, 184 km 41.60% 21.00% 20.79% 10.31% 3.88% 
 
This analysis begins to indicate which scenarios are of greatest concern to Sikeston.  
Those scenarios with at least 5% of total floor area at least extensively damaged are 
summarized in Table 3-19. 
 
Table 3-19 
Scenarios with Greatest Damage to Building Stock, Sikeston 
Scenario Percent With Extensive or 
Complete Damage 
M 5.5, 0 km 5.36% 
M 6, 0 km 14.69% 
M 6, 10 km 11.81% 
M 6, 25 km 5.95% 
M 7, 34 km 24.33% 
M 7, 63 km 9.48% 
M 8, 34 km 61.02% 
M 8, 63 km 43.64% 
M 8, 122 km 27.88% 
M 8, 184 km 14.19% 
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Table 3-20 shows the same damage state summary for all the scenarios, but by number of 
buildings. 
 
 
 
Table 3-20 
Damage States by Number of Buildings (Total 8,231), Sikeston 
Scenario None  Slight Moderate  Extensive Complete 
M5, 0 km 7,195 744 251 36 5 
M5, 10 km 7,413 616 172 29 1 
M5, 25 km 7,939 224 65 3 0 
M5, 50 km 8,093 108 30 0 0 
M5, 100 km 8,231 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 4,281 2,473 1,205 229 43 
M5.5, 10 km 5,172 2,043 846 142 28 
M5.5, 25 km 6,496 1,240 423 63 9 
M5.5, 50 km 7,648 446 117 20 0 
M5.5, 100 km 8,101 98 32 0 0 
M6, 0 km 2,857 2,743 1,907 560 164 
M6, 10 km 3,284 2,675 1,695 452 125 
M6, 25 km 4,690 2,191 1,068 230 52 
M6, 50 km 6,681 1,105 381 58 6 
M6, 100 km 7,840 303 82 6 0 
M7, 34 km 2,430 2,613 2,024 795 369 
M7, 63 km 4,586 2,105 1,138 327 75 
M7, 122 km 6,433 1,221 486 83 8 
M7, 184 km 7,298 687 218 28 0 
M8, 34 km 455 1,677 2,856 1,452 1,791 
M8, 63 km 1,658 2,434 2,176 1,043 920 
M8, 122 km 3,221 2,281 1,532 786 411 
M8, 184 km 4,939 1,695 1,042 437 118 
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Table 3-21 
Casualties by Location, by Time of Day(number of people), Sikeston 
Scenario 2am 2pm 5pm 
 Home Work Commute  Home Work Commute Home Work Commute  
M5, 0 km 8 0 0 3 9 0 3 3 0 
M5, 10 km 4 0 0 2 5 0 2 2 0 
M5, 25 km 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
M5, 50 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 54 1 0 19 60 0 23 20 0 
M5.5, 10 km 35 1 0 13 40 0 15 13 0 
M5.5, 25 km 14 0 0 5 15 0 6 5 0 
M5.5, 50 km 3 0 0 1 3 0 1 1 0 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
M6, 0 km 149 4 0 53 194 1 63 66 2 
M6, 10 km 116 3 0 42 149 0 49 51 2 
M6, 25 km 56 2 0 20 68 0 24 23 0 
M6, 50 km 11 0 0 4 13 0 5 4 0 
M6, 100 km 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 
M7, 34 km 259 9 0 92 380 1 109 130 5 
M7, 63 km 69 3 0 25 110 0 30 38 1 
M7, 122 km 13 1 0 4 20 0 5 7 0 
M7, 184 km 4 0 0 2 6 0 2 2 0 
M8, 34 km 923 40 1 328 1557 5 390 538 17 
M8, 63 km 528 24 0 189 940 2 224 325 8 
M8, 122 km 272 13 0 97 499 1 115 173 3 
M8, 184 km 79 6 0 28 202 0 34 71 1 
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Table 3-22 
Casualties by Severity Classification, by Time of Day, Sikeston 
 
 2:00 AM 2:00 PM 5:00 PM 
Scenario 1  2 3 4 1  2 3 4 1  2 3 4 
M5, 0 km 7 1 0 0 10 1 0 0 6 1 0 0 
M5, 10 km 4 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
M5, 25 km 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
M5, 50 km 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 47 7 1 1 67 10 1 1 38 6 1 1 
M5.5, 10 km 31 5 0 0 44 7 1 1 24 4 0 0 
M5.5, 25 km 12 2 0 0 17 2 0 0 10 1 0 0 
M5.5, 50 km 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M6, 0 km 128 22 2 2 205 35 4 4 107 19 3 2 
M6, 10 km 100 17 2 2 159 27 3 3 84 15 2 2 
M6, 25 km 49 8 1 1 74 12 1 1 39 6 1 1 
M6, 50 km 10 1 0 0 15 2 0 0 8 1 0 0 
M6, 100 km 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
M7, 34 km 221 39 4 4 387 70 8 8 197 37 6 4 
M7, 63 km 61 10 1 1 113 19 2 2 57 10 1 1 
M7, 122 km 12 1 0 0 21 3 0 0 11 1 0 0 
M7, 184 km 4 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
M8, 34 km 780 150 17 17 1519 296 38 37 751 151 24 19 
M8, 63 km 449 84 10 10 914 174 22 21 446 87 13 11 
M8, 122 km 233 42 5 5 486 90 11 11 235 44 6 5 
M8, 184 km 71 12 1 1 190 33 4 4 87 15 2 2 
 
 
 
In all the Sikeston scenarios, daytime casualties exceed nighttime casualties, probably 
reflecting the fact that most residences are in wood-frame buildings. 
 
The scenarios that would place the greatest demand on medical services–those that would 
result in at least 30 total casualties– are summarized in Table 3-23.  
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Table 3-23 
Scenarios with Largest Number of Casualties, Sikeston 
Scenario Total 
Casualties, 
 2 pm 
Hospitalization 
(Severity 2+3), 
2 pm 
Deaths, 
 2 pm 
M 5.5, 0 km 79 11 1 
M 5.5, 10 km 53 8 1 
M 6, 0 km 248 39 4 
M 6, 10 km 192 30 3 
M 6, 25 km 88 13 1 
M 7, 34 km 473 78 8 
M 7, 63 km 136 21 2 
M 8, 34 km 1,890 334 37 
M 8, 63 km 1,131 196 21 
M 8, 122 km 598 101 11 
M 8, 184 km 231 37 4 
 
 
Table 3-24 
Fire Following Earthquake, Sikeston 
Scenario # Of Ignitions  Population Exposed Value Exposed 
(thous. 1994 $) 
M5, 0 km 2 10 574 
M5, 10 km 2 10 574 
M5, 25 km 1 0 0 
M5, 50 km 0 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 2 10 574 
M5.5, 10 km 2 10 574 
M5.5, 25 km 1 0 0 
M5.5, 50 km 0 0 0 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 0 
M6, 0 km 2 20 1,003 
M6, 10 km 2 7 349 
M6, 25 km 2 10 574 
M6, 50 km 1 0 0 
M6, 100 km 0 0 0 
M7, 34 km 1 14 614 
M7, 63 km 2 10 574 
M7, 122 km 0 0 0 
M7, 184 km 0 0 0 
M8, 34 km 5 21 1,100 
M8, 63 km 2 10 574 
M8, 122 km 2 10 574 
M8, 184 km 1 0 0 
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Eleven of the 23 scenarios predict multiple ignitions.  Fire following earthquake does not 
appear to be an unmanageable problem in Sikeston, according to these simulations; 
although, of course, every fire is important to its victims.  Only two scenarios threaten 
more than 20 people and $1 million in property. These are highlighted in the table. 
 
Table 3-25 summarizes estimates of displaced households and shelter needs for the 23 
Sikeston earthquake scenarios. 
 
Table 3-25 
Emergency Shelter Demands, Sikeston 
Scenario Displaced 
Households  
People Requiring Short-Term 
Shelter 
M5, 0 km 5 6 
M5, 10 km 0 0 
M5, 25 km 0 0 
M5, 50 km 0 0 
M5, 100 km 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 114 100 
M5.5, 10 km 18 16 
M5.5, 25 km 14 14 
M5.5, 50 km 0 0 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 
M6, 0 km 250 215 
M6, 10 km 203 174 
M6, 25 km 106 93 
M6, 50 km 14 14 
M6, 100 km 0 0 
M7, 34 km 458 390 
M7, 63 km 122 104 
M7, 122 km 14  14 
M7, 184 km  0 0 
M8, 34 km 1768 1505 
M8, 63 km 908 776 
M8, 122 km 455  390 
M8, 184 km 133  115 
 
 
Nine of the scenarios are expected to require shelter for at least 100 people.  These are 
highlighted in the table. If the earthquake occurs in the winter and disrupts power, these 
numbers could be substantially higher. 
 
Table 3-26 summarizes direct economic losses for all the Sikeston earthquake scenarios.  
Figure 3-4 depicts the total losses according to magnitude and distance from Sikeston. 
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Table 3-26 
Direct Economic Losses for Buildings (Thousands of 1994 $), Sikeston 
Scenario Capital Stock Losses Income Losses Total 
Loss 
 1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6* 7* 8*  
M5, 0 km 1,946 18,006 15,007 484 2,030 631 878 832 39,814 
M5, 10 km 1,356 12,789 10,861 384 1,278 512 704 537 28,421 
M5, 25 km 378 3,544 3,159 135 273 95 126 102 7,812 
M5, 50 km 156 471 331 7 51 11 22 14 1,063 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 9,989 50,899 30,707 940 11,518 2,843 4,051 4,819 115,766 
M5.5, 10 km 6,883 34,203 22,671 727 7,066 1,999 2,779 2,901 79,229 
M5.5, 25 km 3,232 15,011 10,624 352 3,445 854 1,160 1,388 35,706 
M5.5, 50 km 924 3,078 1,709 65 741 204 304 267 7,292 
M5.5, 100 km 160 230 104 1 59 15 27 17 613 
M6, 0 km 21,729 89,183 48,492 1,446 22,969 6,745 9,516 9,977 210,057 
M6, 10 km 17,920 71,163 38,402 1,227 19,148 5,477 7,596 8,277 169,210 
M6, 25 km 9,800 35,785 20,091 679 11,019 3,160 4,298 4,697 89,529 
M6, 50 km 2,988 10,154 6,107 245 3,265 907 1,248 1,338 26,252 
M6, 100 km 541 1,569 657 26 523 119 161 181 3,777 
M7, 34 km 33,094 95,044 38,495 1,217 31,988 10,316 14,245 14,346 238,745 
M7, 63 km 12,816 35,156 16,481 563 13,501 4,650 6,288 5,840 95,295 
M7, 122 km 3,984 10,906 5,490 231 4,217 1,366 1,872 1,734 29,800 
M7, 184 km 1,636 3,807 1,614 64 1,481 605 833 618 10,658 
M8, 34 km 95,526 268,260 80,366 2,497 77,891 25,997 35,457 36,316 622,310 
M8, 63 km 58,806 142,736 41,385 1,280 50,725 18,294 24,834 23,519 361,579 
M8, 122 km 34,505 77,061 22,559 700 32,011 11,874 16,179 16,649 209,538 
M8, 184 km 16,387 32,934 10,990 411 16,004 6,351 8,623 7,109 98,809 
* 1=Structural Damage, 2= Non-structural Damage, 3=Contents Damage, 4=Inventory 
Loss, 5=Relocation Loss, 6=Capital Related Loss, 7=Wage Losses, 8=Rental Income 
LossesSeven of the scenarios would result in over $100 million in costs to the community 
(over $4,000 per person). 
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Figure 3-4 
Direct Economic Losses, Sikeston 
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CHAPTER 4 
HAZUS ANALYSIS OF INVENTORY DATA 
 
HAZUS has the capability to estimate direct structural, nonstructural, and contents losses 
to specific user-defined structures.  We applied this analysis to the buildings in our ATC-
21 inventories for Carbondale and Sikeston. 
 
INPUT DATA 
 
To run the user-defined structure module of HAZUS required that we add several fields 
to our ATC-21 inventory.  For all structures this included: 
 
Structural Building Classification.  This is the same as the ATC-21 
classification, but with the addition of categories for low-rise (1-3 stories), mid-
rise (4-7) and high-rise (8+). 
 
Design Level.  This describes the estimated seismic design characteristics of the 
building, based on a combination of the building’s age and its seismic hazard 
zone. This combination reflects the assumed seismic design practices, based on 
the location and date of construction.  This rating defines the building damage 
function in HAZUS. Carbondale is in NEHRP Map Area 4, which means that the 
seismic design level is Low for all buildings built since 1941, and Pre-code for 
older buildings (HAZUS Technical Manual, Table 5.20; though note that HAZUS 
treats Low and Pre-code buildings the same). Sikeston is in Map Area 5, which 
means that the seismic design level is Moderate for post-1975 buildings, Low for 
1941-1975, and Pre-code for older buildings.. 
 
Bias.  This refers to construction quality: “Poor,” “Typical,” or “Superior.”  It 
allows the user to add this bias if they have particular knowledge of the 
construction quality.  We assumed “Typical” quality for all the buildings in the 
two inventories. 
 
Foundation. Foundations can be classified as deep or shallow.  We assumed 
shallow foundations for all buildings. 
 
Year.  This required a specific year of construction. For each building, we used 
our best estimate of the year of construction, in consultation with local building 
officials. 
 
Building and Contents Value . Building replacement value was estimated as a 
product of floor area and construction cost per square foot. We used the 
construction cost estimates provided by J&L Robinson Construction to the 
Carbondale Building Inspector (see Chapter 2). Contents value is estimated 
according to the method used by HAZUS: as a percentage of building value, 
according to occupancy type (HAZUS Technical Manual, Table 15.5).  Generally, 
contents values are 50% of building value for residential uses; 150% for 
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industrial, medical facilities, emergency response facilities, and universities; and 
100% for all other uses. 
 
 
For hospitals, it also included: 
Number of beds .  We obtained this information directly from the hospitals. 
 
 
For hospitals and emergency response facilities, it also included: 
 
Power.  This describes whether there is a backup power system.  We assume no 
backup power, unless we have specific information otherwise. 
 
Number of trucks.  We obtained the number of fire trucks directly from the fire 
departments. 
 
Daytime Capacity.  This is the maximum number of occupants in the daytime.  
We estimated this according to Table 3.2 in ATC-13 (Applied Technology 
Council, 1985), based on floor area of the building. 
 
Nighttime Capacity.  Estimated same as Daytime. 
 
Kitchen. This identifies whether there is a kitchen on the premises.  We obtained 
this information directly from the facilities. 
 
For schools, it also included: 
 
Number of students. We obtained this directly from the school districts. 
 
Shelter capacity. Carbondale staff provided estimates of the shelter capacity of 
schools (this does not count additional shelter space that would be available in 
churches and other facilities).  We did not obtain any shelter estimates for 
Sikeston. 
 
Kitchen.   This identifies whether there is a kitchen on the premises.  We obtained 
this directly from the facilities. 
 
 
ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR SURVEYED BUILDINGS   
 
The following tables summarize direct economic losses for the two sets of inventories.  It 
is important to note that these represent only direct structural, nonstructural and contents 
losses, and do not reflect the other categories of direct losses used in the community-wide 
loss estimates (inventory, relocation, capital-related, wages, rental income). 
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Table 4-1 
Expected annual direct economic losses for 295 Carbondale buildings 
($1,000s, 2001 dollars) 
 
Scenario Construction 
Cost 
Contents 
Cost 
Total 
Cost 
M5, 0 km 10,867 10,044 20,911 
M5, 10 km 8,420 7,687 16,107 
M5, 25 km 2,491 2,392 4,883 
M5, 50 km 209 182 391 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 34,925 20,081 55,006 
M5.5, 10 km 23,130 14,509 37,639 
M5.5, 25 km 9,600 7,195 16,795 
M5.5, 50 km 1,326 914 2,240 
M5.5, 100 km 137 76 213 
M6, 0 km 88,674 30,321 118,995 
M6, 10 km 64,109 23,102 87,211 
M6, 25 km 29,570 13,310 42,880 
M6, 50 km 5,889 3,526 9,415 
M6, 100 km 1,060 816 2,419 
M7, 116 km 10,183 5,074 15,257 
M7, 173 km 4,319 2,023 6,342 
M7, 234 km 1,603 816 2,419 
M7, 295 km 702 260 962 
M8, 116 km 67,716 12,641 80,357 
M8, 173 km 43,609 8,785 52,394 
M8, 234 km 21,978 5,978 27,956 
M8, 295 km 10,507 3,326 13,833 
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Table 4-2 
Expected annual direct economic losses for 124 Sikeston buildings 
($1,000s, 2001 dollars) 
 
Scenario Construction 
Cost 
Contents 
Cost 
Total 
Cost 
M5, 0 km 3,505 3,288 6,793 
M5, 10 km 2,510 2,390 4,900 
M5, 25 km 684 692 1,376 
M5, 50 km 96 71 167 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 
M5.5, 0 km 8,592 6,185 14,776 
M5.5, 10 km 5,959 4,421 10,380 
M5.5, 25 km 2,767 2,084 4,851 
M5.5, 50 km 605 393 998 
M5.5, 100 km 62 26 88 
M6, 0 km 15,988 9,393 25,381 
M6, 10 km 12,328 7,200 19,528 
M6, 25 km 6,302 3,789 10,090 
M6, 50 km 2,175 1,395 3,570 
M6, 100 km 357 183 541 
M7, 34 km 17,919 7126 25044 
M7, 63 km 7,558 3258 10815 
M7, 122 km 2,612 1222 3835 
M7, 184 km 910 386 1297 
M8, 34 km 54,127 14269 68396 
M8, 63 km 30,319 7468 37787 
M8, 122 km 16,333 4084 20417 
M8, 184 km 8,948 2475 11423 
 
 
CASUALTY ESTIMATES 
 
HAZUS does not have a method of estimating casualties for user-defined facilities.  A 
tedious, manual method exists, but would involve separate estimates for each of the 419 
buildings for each of the scenarios in the two cities.  Nevertheless, we applied the method 
to two dormitories on the SIU campus in Carbondale, because these buildings are among 
the most significant concerns with respect to potential casualties. 
 
Both buildings were surveyed by IEMA in 1992, and so our estimates are based on their 
field data. Dormitory 1 is a concrete frame (C3), 4-story building constructed in 1956, 
with an estimated floor area of 28,300 sf.  Dormitory 2 is a URM, 4-story building 
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constructed in 1965, with an estimated floor area of 85,600 sf.  For occupancy, we 
estimated 2.0 occupants per 1,000 sf in the daytime and 3.0 occupants per 1,000 sf in the 
nighttime, as per Table 3-8 in FEMA-227 (VSP Associates, 1991, adapted from ATC-
13).  This results in daytime and nighttime occupancy estimates of 57 and 85 for 
Dormitory 1 and 171 and 257 for Dormitory 2.   
Table 4-3 summarizes nighttime casualties for the two buildings.  Highlighted are those 
scenarios for which total casualties for either building add up to greater than 0.7; these 
are all scenarios for which at least one casualty is considered likely. 
 
Table 4-3 
Estimated Nighttime Casualties for Two Dormitories, Carbondale 
 
 Dormitory 1 (C3) Dormitory 2 (URM) 
Scenario Severity 
1 
Severity 
2 
Severity 
3 
Severity 
 4 
 Severity 
1 
Severity 
2 
Severity 
3 
Severity 
4 
M5, 0 km 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.069 0.007 0.000 0.000 
M5, 10 km 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.058 0.006 0.000 0.000 
M5, 25 km 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.014 0.001 0.000 0.000 
M5, 50 km 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
M5, 100 km 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
M5.5, 0 km 0.094 0.009 0.000 0.000  0.983 0.150 0.013 0.013 
M5.5, 10 km 0.067 0.007 0.000 0.000  0.323 0.032 0.000 0.000 
M5.5, 25 km 0.027 0.003 0.000 0.000  0.157 0.016 0.000 0.000 
M5.5, 50 km 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.018 0.002 0.000 0.000 
M5.5, 100 km 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
M6, 0 km 0.629 0.104 0.013 0.013  2.675 0.422 0.040 0.040 
M6, 10 km 0.453 0.073 0.009 0.009  1.979 0.301 0.027 0.027 
M6, 25 km 0.094 0.009 0.000 0.000  0.993 0.151 0.013 0.013 
M6, 50 km 0.025 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.157 0.016 0.000 0.000 
M6, 100 km 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.031 0.003 0.000 0.000 
M7, 116 km 0.057 0.006 0.000 0.000  0.406 0.041 0.000 0.000 
M7, 173 km 0.023 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.180 0.018 0.000 0.000 
M7, 234 km 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.055 0.006 0.000 0.000 
M7, 295 km 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.030 0.003 0.000 0.000 
M8, 116 km 2.258 0.419 0.061 0.061  8.018 1.419 0.160 0.160 
M8, 173 km 1.252 0.222 0.030 0.030  4.541 0.763 0.080 0.080 
M8, 234 km 0.297 0.043 0.004 0.004  2.615 0.416 0.040 0.040 
M8, 295 km 0.057 0.006 0.000 0.000  0.396 0.040 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Because Dormitory 2 is a URM building, its probability of sustaining earthquake-related 
casualties is much greater than Dormitory 1.  In addition, it is approximately three times 
larger than Dormitory 1.  Therefore, seven of the 23 scenarios are expected to result in at 
least one casualty in Dormitory 2, compared to three of the scenarios for Dormitory 1.  
Even so, the chances of serious injury are quite low for all the scenarios.  Only two of the 
scenarios (the two nearest M8 earthquakes) are likely to have one injury requiring 
hospitalization.  Furthermore, most of these scenarios have relatively low probabilities of 
occurring (see Chapter 5).  For example, using the probabilities developed in Chapter 5, 
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the highlighted scenarios in Table 4-3 have a 0.08% chance of occurring in any given 
year, and a 3.9% chance of occurring in the next 50 years; that is, there is approximately 
a 4% chance of having an earthquake in the next 50 years that would be large enough to 
cause one casualty (most likely a minor one) in either dormitory. 
 
We also estimated the annualized casualty probabilities (see Chapter 5), which are shown 
in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4 
Annualized Casualties for Two Dormitories, Carbondale 
 Severity 1 Severity 2 Severity 3 Severity 4 
Dormitory 1 (Concrete, 85 occupants)     
One year 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30 years 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.001 
50 years 0.043 0.007 0.001 0.001 
Dormitory 2 (URM, 257 occupants)     
One year 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 
30 years 0.117 0.018 0.002 0.002 
50 years 0.194 0.030 0.003 0.003 
 
According to this analysis, it is unlikely that these dormitories will have any earthquake-
related casualties during their lifetime.   Assuming that these are representative of 
approximately 20 dormitory buildings on the campus, this analysis suggests that 
approximately two minor injuries could occur due to earthquakes in the next 50 years.  It 
further suggests only about 0.45 hospitalization injury or death in the next 50 years; in 
probabilistic terms, this is a 45% chance of one hospitalization (including a slight 
possibility of one death) due to earthquake in the 20 dormitories over the next 50 years.   
Even so, the ATC-21 survey suggests that they warrant further inspection by a structural 
engineer to verify.  Furthermore, economic loss is still a concern; our analysis shows, for 
example, that Dormitory 2 could experience direct economic losses of $200,000 to over 
$400,000 in a M8 event within 234 km. 
 
 
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
 
Although HAZUS estimates post-earthquake functionality of essential facilities using its 
default inventories, we chose to perform the analysis using only our augmented ATC-21 
survey as inputs.  For each essential facility, HAZUS estimates restoration curves, 
describing the proportion of facilities in each damage state that would restore their 
functions over time.  This admittedly abstract concept can also be expressed in terms of 
hospital beds, available trucks, or shelter capacity. 
 
Carbondale 
 
Table 4-5 describes the functionality of the Carbondale hospital for each scenario, at 
various times after the earthquake.  The Day 1 and Day 3 functionalities describe its 
ability to treat earthquake victims.  The longer time periods indicate its ability to quickly 
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return to normal operations.  We multiply the percent functionality times the number of 
beds to provide a more tangible measure of the hospital’s ability to serve patients. 
 
 
Table 4-5 Carbondale Hospital Functionality (Total # of Beds = 151) 
Scenario At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30 At Day 90 
 Beds  % Beds  % Beds  % Beds  % Beds  % 
M5, 0 km 138 91.4 141 93.4 146 96.7 150 99.3 151 100.0 
M5, 10 km 150 99.3 150 99.3 151 100.0 151  100.0 151 100.0 
M5, 25 km 151 100.0 151  100.0 151 100.0 151  100.0 151 100.0 
M5, 50 km 151 100.0 151  100.0 151 100.0 151  100.0 151 100.0 
M5, 100 km 85 56.3 97 64.2 113 74.8 140 92.7 149 98.7 
M5.5, 0 km 103 68.2 113 74.8 125 82.8 145 98.0 149 98.7 
M5.5, 10 km 128 84.8 133 88.1 140 92.7 149 98.7 151 100.0 
M5.5, 25 km 147 97.4 147 97.4 149 98.7 149 98.7 149 98.7 
M5.5, 50 km 151 100.0 151  100.0 151 100.0 151  100.0 151 100.0 
M5.5, 100 km 40 26.5 53 35.1 71 47.0 121 80.1 143 94.7 
M6, 0 km 52 34.4 66 43.7 84 55.6 128 84.8 145 96.0 
M6, 10 km 85 56.3 97 64.2 113 74.8 140 92.7 149 98.7 
M6, 25 km 125 82.8 131 88.8 139 92.1 149 98.7 151 100.0 
M6, 50 km 145 96.0 147 97.4 149 98.7 151 100.0 151 100.0 
M6, 100 km 85 56.29 97 64.24 113 74.83 140 92.72 149 98.68 
M7, 116 km 112 74.17 120 79.47 131 86.75 147 97.35 151 100.0 
M7, 173 km 135 89.40 139 92.05 144 95.36 150 99.34 151 100.0 
M7, 234 km 142 94.04 144 95.36 147 97.35 150 99.34 151 100.0 
M7, 295 km 13 8.61 21 13.91 34 22.52 87 57.62 124 82.12 
M8, 116 km 26 17.22 37 24.50 54 35.76 108 71.52 137 90.73 
M8, 173 km 41 27.15 55 36.42 73 48.34 121 80.13 143 94.70 
M8, 234 km 67 44.37 80 52.98 98 64.90 135 89.40 148 98.01 
 
 
In nine of the 23 scenarios the hospital is expected to be operating at less than 70% of 
capacity three days after the earthquake (highlighted).   
 
Not only would an earthquake constrain the ability of essential facilities to provide 
services, but it would also place demands on them.  Based on the analysis of casualties in 
Chapter 3, Table 4-6 compares Day 1 and Day 3 capacities with the number of expected 
injuries requiring hospitalization (Severity 2 and 3), for those scenarios that result in 
significant numbers of casualties. 
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Table 4-6 
Hospital Capacity for High-Casualty Scenarios, Carbondale 
 
Scenario Total 
Casualties, 2 pm 
Hospitalization 
(Severity 2+3) 
Beds, 
 Day 1 
Beds,  
Day 3 
M 5, 0 km 34 5 134 138 
M 5.5, 0 km 141 21 85 97 
M 5.5, 10 km 87 12 103 113 
M 5.5, 25 km 40 5 128 133 
M 6, 0 km 463 77 40 53 
M 6, 10 km 338 55 52 66 
M 6, 25 km 147 22 85 97 
M 6, 50 km 32 4 125 131 
M 7, 116 km 70 10 85 97 
M 8, 116 km 1,365 236 13 21 
M 8, 173 km 682 115 26 37 
M 8, 234 km 313 50 41 55 
M 8, 295 km 127 20 67 80 
 
 
In five of the scenarios (the two closest M 6 events and the three closest M 8 events), 
highlighted above, hospitalizations exceed the number of beds available.  In addition, 
several other events would strain the capability of the hospital.  For example, according 
to the default HAZUS analysis, four of the scenarios would result in at least 10 injuries 
requiring medical attention when the hospital would be less than 60% functiona l on the 
day of the earthquake. 
 
Similar to the method used for hospital functionality, HAZUS also estimates the 
functionality of emergency response facilities and schools. In particular, we measure the 
ability of the schools to be used as post-earthquake emergency shelters. Table 4-7 
summarizes the functionality of these facilities on Day 1, for the 23 Carbondale 
scenarios. 
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Table 4-7 
Emergency Response Facilities and School Functionality at Day 1, Carbondale 
Scenario Emergency Response 
Facilities 
School 
 Functionality 
(%) 
Fire Trucks 
Available  
(12 total) 
Functionality (%)  Shelter Capacity 
Available  (people) 
M5, 0 km 13.31 2 13.66 666 
M5, 10 km 19.47 2 20.34 992 
M5, 25 km 48.05 6 49.06 2393 
M5, 50 km 89.14 11 89.21 4352 
M5, 100 km 99.91 12 99.92 4874 
M5.5, 0 km 6.93 1 6.99 341 
M5.5, 10 km 10.30 1 10.48 511 
M5.5, 25 km 26.23 3 26.78 1306 
M5.5, 50 km 77.72 9 77.93 3801 
M5.5, 100 km 96.77 12 96.73 4718 
M6, 0 km 3.62 0 3.47 169 
M6, 10 km 5.32 1 5.25 256 
M6, 25 km 14.40 2 14.33 699 
M6, 50 km 54.02 6 54.23 2645 
M6, 100 km 87.35 10 87.11 4249 
M7, 116 km 51.36 6 51.38 2506 
M7, 173 km 77.58 9 77.28 3770 
M7, 234 km 91.62 11 91.47 4462 
M7, 295 km 95.65 11 95.95 4680 
M8, 116 km 14.29 2 13.87 677 
M8, 173 km 30.21 4 31.72 1547 
M8, 234 km 52.90 6 52.57 2564 
M8, 295 km 70.91 9 70.80 3454 
Note: Total school shelter capacity is 4,878 people 
 
It is instructive to compare estimates of emergency service functionality to the fire 
ignition estimates, in Chapter 3.  HAZUS predicts less than 50% functionality for 11 of 
the 23 scenarios, and less than 60% functionality for 14 of the 23.  This raises concerns 
about the emergency response facilities.  In particular, the seven scenarios that would 
place the greatest demands on fire services (highlighted in Table 3-12) are precisely those 
that would most severely reduce the capacity of emergency services to respond.  
Combining the estimates from Table 3-12 and Table 4-7 produces the following: 
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Table 4-8 
Scenarios with Greatest Fire Threat, Carbondale 
Scenario Population 
exposed to fire 
ignitions  
Value exposed 
(thousands 1994 $) 
Emergency services 
functionality, Day 1 
M 5, 0 km 83 4,358 13.31% 
M 5, 10 km 87 4,508 19.47% 
M 5.5, 0 km 77 4,019 6.93% 
M 5.5, 10 km 84 4,393 10.30% 
M 6, 0 km 220 13,409 3.62% 
M 6, 10 km 90 4,639 5.32% 
M 6, 25 km 88 4,606 14.40% 
 
 
Sikeston 
 
Table 4-9 summarizes the analysis of hospital functionality in Sikeston. 
 
Table 4-9 
Hospital functionality (Total # of  beds = 188), Sikeston 
Scenario At Day 1 At Day 3 At Day 7 At Day 30 At Day 90 
 Beds  % Beds  % Beds  % Beds  % Beds  % 
M5, 0 km 142 75.53 150 79.79 161 85.64 179 95.21 186 98.94 
M5, 10 km 159 84.57 164 87.23 171 90.96 183 97.34 187 99.47 
M5, 25 km 179 95.21 180 95.74 183 97.34 185 98.40 186 98.94 
M5, 50 km 183 97.34 184 97.87 186 98.94 188 100.00 188 100.00 
M5, 100 km 188 100.00 188 100.00 188 100.00 188  100.00 188  100.00 
M5.5, 0 km 81 43.09 95 50.53 114 60.64 156 82.98 178 94.68 
M5.5, 10 km 104 55.32 116 61.70 132 70.21 167 88.83 182 96.81 
M5.5, 25 km 135 71.81 144 76.60 156 82.98 177 94.15 184 97.87 
M5.5, 50 km 166 88.30 170 90.43 176 93.62 184 97.87 187 99.47 
M5.5, 100 km 183 97.34 184 97.87 186 98.94 188 100.00 188  100.00 
M6, 0 km 38 20.21 50 26.60 67 35.64 122 64.89 159 84.57 
M6, 10 km 53 28.19 67 35.64 86 45.74 138 73.40 170 90.43 
M6, 25 km 85 45.21 98 52.13 116 61.70 157 83.51 177 94.15 
M6, 50 km 139 73.94 147 78.19 158 84.04 179 95.21 186 98.94 
M6, 100 km 172 91.49 175 93.09 179 95.21 185 98.40 186 98.94 
M7, 34 km 24 12.77 35 18.62 50 26.60 105 55.85 148 78.72 
M7, 63 km 79 42.02 93 49.47 112 59.57 156 82.98 178 94.68 
M7, 122 km 133 70.74 143 76.06 155 82.45 178 94.68 186 98.94 
M7, 184 km 155 82.45 162 86.17 170 90.43 183 97.34 187 99.47 
M8, 34 km 2 1.06 4 2.13 8 4.26 32 17.02 75 39.89 
M8, 63 km 9 4.79 14 7.45 23 12.23 68 36.17 118 62.77 
M8, 122 km 24 12.77 35 18.62 50 26.60 105 55.85 148 78.72 
M8, 184 km 76 40.43 89 47.34 108 57.45 154 81.91 177 94.15 
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In 11 of the 23 scenarios the hospital is expected to be operating at less than 70% of 
capacity three days after the earthquake (highlighted).  In particular, Table 4-10 compares 
Day 1 and Day 3 capacities with the number of expected injuries requiring hospitalization 
(Severity 2 and 3), for those scenarios that result in significant numbers of casualties. 
 
 
Table 4-10 
Hospital Capacity for High-Casualty Scenarios, Sikeston 
Scenario Total Casualties, 
2 pm 
Hospitalization 
(Severity 2+3) 
Beds, 
Day 1 
Beds, 
Day 3 
M 5.5, 0 km 79 11 81 95 
M 5.5, 10 km 53 8 104 116 
M 6, 0 km 248 39 38 50 
M 6, 10 km 192 30 53 67 
M 6, 25 km 88 13 85 98 
M 7, 34 km 473 78 24 35 
M 7, 63 km 136 21 79 93 
M 8, 34 km 1,890 334 2 4 
M 8, 63 km 1,131 196 9 14 
M 8, 122 km 598 101 24 35 
M 8, 184 km 231 37 76 89 
   
Five of the scenarios would result in casualties that would exceed the reduced hospital 
capacity on the day of the earthquake.  The M8 scenarios would be particularly 
problematic.  Even without any damage to the hospital, casualties from such an 
earthquake would exceed or severely strain the hospital capacity.  
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Table 4-11 
Emergency response facilities and school functionality at day 1, Sikeston 
Scenario Emergency Response Facilities School 
 Functionality 
(%) 
Fire Trucks 
Available  
(7 total) 
Functionality 
(%)  
Shelter Capacity 
Available 
M5, 0 km 13.23 1 13.50 NA 
M5, 10 km 20.22 1 20.64 NA 
M5, 25 km 49.71 3 50.10 NA 
M5, 50 km 84.96 6 84.82 NA 
M5, 100 km 98.62 7 98.66 NA 
M5.5, 0 km 6.64 0 7.13 NA 
M5.5, 10 km 10.35 1 10.94 NA 
M5.5, 25 km 27.00 2 27.90 NA 
M5.5, 50 km 69.02 5 69.31 NA 
M5.5, 100 km 96.54 7 96.28 NA 
M6, 0 km 3.19 0 3.70 NA 
M6, 10 km 5.05 0 5.75 NA 
M6, 25 km 14.14 1 15.38 NA 
M6, 50 km 44.75 3 45.87 NA 
M6, 100 km 83.29 6 83.92 NA 
M7, 34 km 5.14 0 5.80 NA 
M7, 63 km 21.08 1 21.74 NA 
M7, 122 km 53.68 4 54.33 NA 
M7, 184 km 80.18 6 80.86 NA 
M8, 34 km 0.73 0 0.69 NA 
M8, 63 km 3.73 0 3.76 NA 
M8, 122 km 14.00 1 14.09 NA 
M8, 184 km 35.62 2 32.01 NA 
 
HAZUS predicts less than 50% functionality for emergency response facilities for 16 of 
the 23 scenarios. This raises particular concerns for the emergency response facilities, 
particularly for scenarios with extensive injuries or fires.  In particular, the two scenarios 
that would place the greatest demands on fire services (highlighted in Table 3-24) are 
precisely those that would most severely reduce the capacity of emergency services to 
respond.  Combining the estimates from Table 3-24 and Table 4-11 produces the 
following: 
 
Table 4-12 
Scenarios with Greatest Fire Threat, Sikeston 
 
Scenario Population exposed 
to fire ignitions  
Value exposed 
(thousands 1994 $) 
Emergency services 
functionality, Day 1 
M 6, 0 km 20 1003 3.19% 
M 8, 34 km 21 1100 0.73% 
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As shown in Table 4-12, the two scenarios that pose the greatest fire threat to Sikeston 
are also those that would most severely reduce the ability of emergency services to 
respond.  The M 8 earthquake, because of its widespread effect, would create more 
serious demands on local response, because other communities in the area would not be 
likely to provide assistance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Introduction identified three groups of research questions, regarding: use of HAZUS, 
integration of ATC-21 inventories into HAZUS, and characteristics of seismic risk in 
Mid-America.  This chapter addresses these questions in reverse order. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SEISMIC RISK IN MID-AMERICA 
 
Questions regarding the characteristics of seismic risk in Mid-America: 
 
a. What are the expected earthquake effects in each community?  What is 
the estimated direct damage to essential facilities?  What are the 
expected community demands on essential facilities? 
 
b. How are the damages and casualties distributed across the community? 
What is the effect of structure type?  Functions?  Occupancies?  What 
are the priority candidates for retrofit or replacement? 
 
 
Earthquake Probabilities in Mid-America 
 
To truly understand seismic risk requires consideration of earthquake probabilities.  For 
example, a M8 earthquake 34 km from Sikeston would be devastating for that 
community, but it may be too unlikely for serious consideration. 
 
Seismic probabilities for Mid-America are difficult to estimate, however, because so few 
events have occurred in historic time.  Even the best estimates, therefore, have very high 
uncertainties.   We have selected one set of probability estimates to use as the basis for 
our risk calculations, but our method is such that other probability estimates could be 
substituted for ours. 
 
We base our probability estimates on Johnston and Nava (1985) and related work.  This 
assumes two seismic source zones in Mid-America: a small zone, which represents 
seismicity of the New Madrid seismic zone; and a large zone, which represents diffuse 
seismicity in surrounding areas (Figure 5-1). 
 
Johnston and Nava define Gutenberg-Richter relationships for the two zones, as follows: 
 
 Large zone Log(Nc) = 3.43 - 0.88mb s a ˜  0.060 s b ˜  0.030 (5-1) 
 
 Small zone Log(Nc) = 3.32 - 0.91mb s a ˜  0.090 s b ˜  0.045 (5-2) 
 
Nc is the rate of earthquakes of body magnitude mb or greater per year; and s a and s b are 
standard errors of the first and second constants in each equation.  Note that 1/Nc  is the 
average recurrence interval of an earthquake of magnitude mb.  Body-wave magnitude 
Evaluating Earthquake Risk in Mid-American Communities 
72 
can be converted into moment magnitude, M, by using an empirical relation of Johnston 
(1996): 
 
 M = 3.45 - 0.473mb + 0.145mb2     (5-3) 
 
Alternatively,  
 
 mb = 1.631 + (0.58 M - 1.777)0.5/0.29    (5-4) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 
Seismic Source Zones in Mid-America (Johnston and Nava, 1985) 
 
Uncertainty in equations 5-1 and 5-2 is low at low and moderate magnitudes, but high at 
high magnitudes because of limited historical earthquakes.  Even though earthquakes of 
M =7.0 could only occur near the New Madrid seismic zone, the required crustal area for 
strain energy accumulation far exceeds the size of the small zone. For this reason, 
equation 5-1 is used for recurrence estimation (Johnston and Nava, 1985). 
 
One can then use Poisson probability functions derived by Johnston and Nava to estimate 
conditional probability: 
 
  P(? t) = 1 - e-?t/Tr 
 
or cumulative probability: 
 
  P(T=t) = 1 - e-t/Tr 
 
Where T is a time interval, ? t is the time interval from current time until some time under 
consideration, t is the elapsed time since the last damaging event, and Tr is the average 
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recurrence time of an earthquake event of magnitude M or greater.  Table 5-1 illustrates 
the conditional and cumulative probability estimates for the next 15 years and 50 years.6 
 
 
 
Table 5-1 Time-dependent earthquake probability estimates for the NMSZ 
mb M Recurrence 
Time 
(years) 
Probability of recurrence (%) 
Cumulative                               Conditional 
 
                                                     Next 
15 years 
Next 
50 years 
Next 
15 years 
Next 
50 years 
  =5.3   =5.0 17 87.83 98.52 59.45 95.06 
  =5.7   =5.5 41 69.05 86.83 30.68 70.52 
  =6.1   =6.0 92 73.06 81.57 15.01 41.84 
  =6.8   =7.0 389 40.96 46.04 3.78 12.06 
  =7.4   =8.0 1379 13.75 15.91 1.08 3.56 
 
To standardize the risk analysis, we use annualized probability, which is just the inverse 
of the average recurrence interval. 7  The annual probabilities of our scenario magnitudes 
occurring anywhere within the large seismic source zone are listed in Table 5-2. 
 
These earthquake probabilities are highly uncertain, and it is very difficult to even know 
how uncertain they are.  Statistically, there are not enough data to determine the 
appropriate probability distribution to apply.  For this reason, Johnston and Nava observe 
that standard deviation must be assumed.  For their final probability estimates--based on 
trials assuming four different probability distributions and a range of standard deviations-
-they assume standard deviations of 21% to 24% of average recurrence intervals.8  In 
Table 5-2 we assume standard deviations of 25%.  Table 5-2 lists the estimates, and 
standard deviations, for recurrence interval and annual probability for each of our 
scenario magnitudes. 
 
Table 5-2.   Probabilities and Uncertainties for Scenario Earthquake Magnitudes 
 
M mb Recurrence      
(years) 
Annual   
probability 
Low estimate High estimate 
=5.0 =5.28 17 ± 4 .06018 .04814 .08024 
=5.5 =5.73 41 ± 10 .02444 .01955 .03258 
=6.0 =6.13 92 ± 24 .01084 .008673 .01446 
=7.0 =6.84 389 ± 97 .002571 .002056 .003428 
=8.0 =7.46 1379 ± 345 .0007253 .0005802 .0009671 
                                                 
6 More recent paleoseismic studies suggest that large (M =7.6) events have, in the recent past, occurred 
closer to once every 500 years, which is substantially more frequent than the 1379 years shown in Table 5-
1 (Tuttle, et al, 2002). 
7It is also virtually identical to an annualized conditional probability, where ? t =1.     For Tr > 50, 
annualized conditional probability and annualized probability differ by less than 0.1%. 
8 Seismologists are now less confident regarding the regularity of events on faults, and so the standard 
deviation may well be closer to 50% (see Cramer et al, 2000). 
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These probabilities represent a continuous cumulative probability curve (Figure 5-1).   
 
Figure 5-1 
Mid-America Earthquake Probabilities
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By subtracting probabilities for successive magnitudes, we can estimate the annual 
probability for each range of magnitudes: 
 
Table 5-3 Probabilities for Scenario Earthquake Magnitude Ranges 
 
M Annual 
probability 
Low estimate High estimate
5.0 =M<5.5 .03574 .02860 .04766 
5.5 =M<6.0 .01359 .01088 .01812 
6.0 =M<7.0 .008271 .006617 .01103 
7.0 =M<8.0 .001845 .001476 .002460 
8.0 =M .0007253 .0005802 .0009671 
 
 
Probabilities of the Earthquake Scenarios 
 
Estimating the probabilities of each scenario has three aspects.   First is the probability 
that the specified range of magnitudes (e.g., 5.0 =M < 5.5) will occur within the seismic 
source zone. This probability, which is shown in Table 5-3 for each magnitude range, 
describes the likelihood of an earthquake of such magnitude occurring anywhere in the 
seismic zone, and it may or may not be close enough to cause damage in Carbondale or 
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Sikeston.  As discussed in Chapter 3, we assume that all earthquakes of M =7.0 will 
occur only within the small seismic source zone, along the general alignment of the New 
Madrid seismic zone.  And we assume that all earthquakes of M <7.0 can occur 
anywhere within the large seismic source zone, with equal probability at every location 
within that zone.   
 
Second, we designate each HAZUS scenario to represent the effects of all earthquakes 
that would occur within the specified range of magnitudes.  Thus, for example, we 
assume that each M5.0 scenario represent the effects of all earthquake that would occur 
at that location in the 5.0 = M < 5.5 range.  This is an important simplifying assumption 
that allows us to use our 23 discrete scenarios to represent a continuum of earthquake 
probabilities. 
 
Third, for each magnitude range, we distribute the Table 5-3 probability over all the 
earthquake scenarios of that magnitude.  In other words, we assign a probability to each 
6.0 = M<7.0 scenario so that the sum of the scenario probabilities adds to .008271.   This 
distribution of probabilities over the scenarios requires another set of simplifying 
assumptions, described as follows. 
 
For the large magnitude (M 7.0 or 8.0) earthquakes, we assume that the total probability 
of scenarios is equally distributed along the New Madrid seismic fault within the small 
source zone. Because we selected the epicenter of each scenario as the center point of 
one-fourth of the New Madrid seismic fault, each scenario has a one-fourth share of the 
total probability.  
 
For the moderate magnitude scenarios (M 5.0, 5.5, and 6.0), we partition the probability 
over the scenario distances from each case community: 1 km, 10 km, 25 km, 50 km, and 
100 km.  The share of each scenario is estimated to be proportional to the area of a ring 
centered on each distance.  This is illustrated in Figure 5-2 and Table 5-4.   For example, 
the M6.0 scenario at 25 km away is assumed to represent all M6.0 events that would 
occur between 17.5 and 37.5 km away from the case community, where 17.5 km is an 
average of 10 km and 25 km, and 37.5 km an average of 25 km and 50 km.  The 
probability of an M 6.0 event occurring in this ring is proportionate to the ring’s area as a 
fraction of the large seismic source zone’s area. Similarly, the M6.0 scenario at 10 km 
away represents all M6.0 events that could occur in a ring between 5.5 and 17.5 km. The 
share of the innermost scenario is proportional to the area of a circle centered at the case 
community with a radius of 5.5 km. And the outermost scenario represents the area 
beyond the 75-km circle around the case community; its probability is the difference 
between the total source zone probability and the sum of probabilities of the other 
scenarios in each magnitude group.  
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Table 5-4 Allocation of Probabilities to Moderate (M 5.50, 5.5, 6.0) Earthquake 
Scenarios 
 
Scenario 
Distance(km) 
Ring inner 
radius(km) 
Ring outer 
radius(km) 
Ring Area (km2) Share of source zone 
probabilitya 
1  5.5 95 0.000603 
10 5.5 17.5 867 0.005498 
25 17.5 37.5 3,455 0.021913 
50 37.5 75 13,253 0.084043 
100 75 source zone boundary 140,028 0.887943 
 a.  Area of large seismic source zone is 157,700 km2 
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Figure 5-2.   Distribution of probability for a set of moderate earthquake scenarios. 
The center star represents the case community. 
 
 
 
 
100 km 
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Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analyses for Carbondale and Sikeston require multiplying the loss estimate for each 
HAZUS scenario by its probability of occurring g.  In general, the seismic risk for each 
community can be seen as a hazard probability function multiplied by a loss function, as 
illustrated in Figure 5-3. 
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Figure 5-3.  Calculation of Earthquake Risk 
 
 
Figure 5-3 depicts a risk that increases with earthquake magnitude, but this may not be 
so.  It may decrease, or it may have some other relationship to magnitude. The difficult 
problem in risk analysis is that the most damaging events are the least likely to occur.  
We seek to determine which poses the greatest threat to Mid-American communities: the 
infrequent large events, or the more frequent moderate events?  Infrequent events close to 
the community, or less frequent events at a greater distance away? 
 
Based on our assumptions that cast the 23 scenarios as representing the total earthquake 
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hazard to each community, we can calculate the risk for each scenario, and can then sum 
them to represent the total earthquake risk for each community.   
 
Table 5-5    Annualized Losses, Carbondale Scenarios 
 
Scenario Hospital- 
izations 
(severity 
2&3) 
Deaths 
Direct loss, 
$thousands 
(1994$) 
Direct loss, 
$thousands 
(2001$) 
Annual 
probability 
Annual 
hospital- 
ization 
Annual 
deaths  
Annual 
loss 
(2001$) 
M5, 0 km 5 0 76,406 91,510 0.00002 0.0001 0.0000 1,967 
M5, 10 km 1 0 54,041 64,724 0.00020 0.0002 0.0000 12,718 
M5, 25 km 0 0 14,380 17,223 0.00078 0.0000 0.0000 13,490 
M5, 50 km 0 0 1,661 1,989 0.00300 0.0000 0.0000 5,976 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0.03174 0.0000 0.0000 0 
M5.5, 0 km 21 2 206,273 247,048 0.00001 0.0002 0.0000 2,026 
M5.5, 10 km 12 1 147,990 177,244 0.00007 0.0009 0.0001 13,240 
M5.5, 25 km 5 0 62,413 74,750 0.00030 0.0015 0.0000 22,268 
M5.5, 50 km 1 0 9,442 11,308 0.00114 0.0011 0.0000 12,920 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 1,452 1,739 0.01207 0.0000 0.0000 20,991 
M6, 0 km 77 8 399,909 478,961 0.00001 0.0004 0.0000 2,395 
M6, 10 km 55 5 311,719 373,338 0.00005 0.0025 0.0002 16,987 
M6, 25 km 22 2 158,722 190,097 0.00018 0.0040 0.0004 34,446 
M6, 50 km 4 0 35,910 43,008 0.00070 0.0028 0.0000 29,895 
M6, 100 km 0 0 7,006 8,391 0.00734 0.0000 0.0000 61,624 
M7, 116 km 10 1 66,244 79,339 0.00046 0.0046 0.0005 36,599 
M7, 173 km 3 0 27,725 33,206 0.00046 0.0014 0.0000 15,318 
M7, 234 km 1 0 9,960 11,929 0.00046 0.0005 0.0000 5,503 
M7, 295 km 0 0 4,358 5,219 0.00046 0.0000 0.0000 2,408 
M8, 116 km 236 26 449,912 538,848 0.00018 0.0428 0.0047 97,693 
M8, 173 km 115 12 266,862 319,614 0.00018 0.0208 0.0022 57,946 
M8, 234 km 50 5 143,447 171,803 0.00018 0.0091 0.0009 31,148 
M8, 295 km 20 2 69,917 83,738 0.00018 0.0036 0.0004 15,182 
     TOTAL  0.0964 0.0093 512,740 
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Table 5-6    Annualized Losses, Sikeston Scenarios 
 
 
Scenario Hospital- 
izations 
(severity 
2&3) 
Deaths 
Direct loss, 
$thousands 
(1994$) 
Direct loss, 
$thousands 
(2001$) 
Annual 
probability 
Annual 
hospital- 
ization 
Annual 
deaths  
Annual 
loss 
(2001$) 
M5, 0 km 1 0 39,814 47,684 0.00002 0.0000 0.0000 1,025 
M5, 10 km 1 0 28,421 34,039 0.00020 0.0002 0.0000 6,689 
M5, 25 km 0 0 7,812 9,356 0.00078 0.0000 0.0000 7,329 
M5, 50 km 0 0 1,063 1,273 0.00300 0.0000 0.0000 3,825 
M5, 100 km 0 0 0 0 0.03174 0.0000 0.0000 0 
M5.5, 0 km 11 1 115,766 138,650 0.00001 0.0001 0.0000 1,137 
M5.5, 10 km 8 1 79,229 94,891 0.00007 0.0006 0.0001 7,088 
M5.5, 25 km 2 0 35,706 42,764 0.00030 0.0006 0.0000 12,739 
M5.5, 50 km 0 0 7,292 8,733 0.00114 0.0000 0.0000 9,978 
M5.5, 100 km 0 0 613 734 0.01207 0.0000 0.0000 8,862 
M6, 0 km 39 4 210,057 251,580 0.00001 0.0002 0.0000 1,258 
M6, 10 km 30 3 169,210 202,658 0.00005 0.0014 0.0001 9,221 
M6, 25 km 13 1 89,529 107,227 0.00018 0.0024 0.0002 19,429 
M6, 50 km 2 0 26,252 31,441 0.00070 0.0014 0.0000 21,855 
M6, 100 km 0 0 3,777 4,524 0.00734 0.0000 0.0000 33,222 
M7, 34 km 78 8 238,745 285,939 0.00046 0.0360 0.0037 131,904 
M7, 63 km 21 2 95,295 114,132 0.00046 0.0097 0.0009 52,649 
M7, 122 km 3 0 29,800 35,691 0.00046 0.0014 0.0000 16,464 
M7, 184 km 1 0 10,658 12,765 0.00046 0.0005 0.0000 5,888 
M8, 34 km 334 37 622,310 745,325 0.00018 0.0606 0.0067 135,127 
M8, 63 km 196 21 361,579 433,054 0.00018 0.0355 0.0038 78,513 
M8, 122 km 101 11 209,538 250,958 0.00018 0.0183 0.0020 45,499 
M8, 184 km 37 4 98,809 118,341 0.00018 0.0067 0.0007 21,455 
    TOTAL  0.1754 0.0183 631,157 
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Figure 5-4.  Annualized Losses, Carbondale and Sikeston Scenarios 
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Another way to look at these numbers is to summarize by magnitudes, as shown in 
Tables 5-7 and 5-8..  These tables allow one to compare the relative effects of various 
magnitude earthquakes occurring anywhere in the region, and they can show which 
magnitude events pose the greatest overall risks to each community.  
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Table 5-7   Annualized Losses by Magnitude, Carbondale 
Magnitude  Annual 
hospital- 
ization 
Annual 
deaths  
Annual loss 
(2001$) 
    
5.0-5.5 0.0003 0.0000 34,152 
5.5-6.0 0.0037 0.0001 71,445 
6.0-7.0 0.0097 0.0006 145,347 
7.0-8.0 0.0065 0.0005 59,827 
8.0+ 0.0763 0.0082 201,969 
TOTAL 0.0964 0.0093 512,740 
 
 
Table 5-8   Annualized Losses by Magnitude, Sikeston 
 
Magnitude  Annual 
hospital- 
ization 
Annual 
deaths  
Annual loss 
(2001$) 
    
5.0-5.5 0.0002 0.0000 18,867 
5.5-6.0 0.0013 0.0001 39,805 
6.0-7.0 0.0053 0.0003 84,986 
7.0-8.0 0.0475 0.0046 206,905 
8.0+ 0.1211 0.0132 280,594 
TOTAL 0.1754 0.0183 631,157 
 
Interpretation of Risk Analysis Results 
 
So, what do all these numbers mean for residents, officials, and property owners in these 
communities?  We identify several key conclusions, and then discuss their implications: 
 
1. Neither community can expect earthquakes to cause many deaths or injuries 
requiring hospitalization (assuming that the HAZUS casualty models are 
reasonably accurate).  Although the annual numbers seem quite small, a more 
cautious way to express this would be over a person’s 70-year lifetime.  Over 
such a time span, Carbondale would expect to have 7 injuries needing 
hospitalization and 0.6 deaths, and Sikeston would have 12 injuries requiring 
hospitalization and 1.3 deaths. 
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2. In both communities, the M 8.0+ earthquakes represent the greatest risk to human 
life.  These earthquakes account for over 69% of the annualized expected injuries 
and deaths in each community.  
 
3. For both communities, annualized direct losses are relatively low, at about 
$500,000 to $600,000 per year.  Although low, these amounts are still significant, 
for at least two reasons.   
 
First, direct losses represent only part of the economic effects of earthquakes.  The actual 
economic effects on the communities would be much greater.   
 
Second, the losses are more significant if one takes a medium-term view.  Most 
plans and policies address time periods of several years, reflecting the long-term 
interests of the community.  This is because current residents can be expected to 
continue to live and work in the community for many years, and because any new 
structures or land uses can be expected to exist as permanent parts of the 
community for at least 30 years.  Viewed in these terms, the expected losses 
amount to $5 to $6 million per decade, or $15 to $18 million per 30 years. 
 
4. In Carbondale, annualized losses for M > 7.0 are nearly equal to those for M < 
7.0.  This is because of the large annualized losses for M 6.0-7.0 and for M 8.0+.   
Moderate earthquakes, of M < 6.0, pose a relatively small threat, amounting to 
only about 20% of total annualized risk.  Thus the greatest risk to Carbondale 
comes from moderate M 6.0-7.0 events and large M 8.0+ events. 
 
5. In Sikeston, earthquakes of M > 7.0 represent over 75% of total annualized losses. 
 
6. What is the chance of having a damaging earthquake each year, or over the next 
30 years?  From Tables 5-5 and 5-6, we can sum the probabilities for all the 
damaging scenarios (all except the most distant M 5 scenarios).  This shows that 
each community has a 2.844% chance per year of a damaging earthquake, or a 
57.4% chance of having a damaging earthquake in a 30-year period. 
 
Most importantly, the difficult issue in Mid-America is how to respond to different types 
of earthquake risk: how to value small, frequent losses versus large, infrequent losses.  
We illustrate with two examples. 
 
On the one hand, it is clear that M > 7.0 earthquakes represent the greatest 
annualized risk to Sikeston.  On the other hand, this risk is computed by 
multiplying enormous losses by an annual probability of only 0.0026.  An 
earthquake of M > 7.0 is expected to occur, on average, once every 389 years.  
Looked at another way, however, over the 50-year life of a built environment, 
such an earthquake has a 12% chance of occurring.  These are small, but finite, 
odds of a highly destructive event.  At best, a M 7.0 event occurring far southwest 
of Sikeston would cause over $10 million in direct damage, and 8 injuries (7 
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minor, and one requiring hospitalization).  If it occurs closer to Sikeston, or if it 
exceeds M 7.0, its effects would be dramatically greater. 
 
For Carbondale, M < 6.0 earthquakes represent only 20% of earthquake risk.   But 
the annual probability is 0.0493, which means such an earthquake is expected to 
occur, on average, once every 20 years.  With an annualized risk of about 
$100,000, these earthquakes are expected to cause $1 million in damage every 
decade.  On average, such an earthquake is expected to affect Carbondale every 
20 years, and, on average, it would cause $2 million in direct damage. 
 
These two examples suggest that each community should be concerned enough about the 
threat to take prudent, cost-effective actions.  Economic damage is likely to occur, and 
life-endangering events have a finite chance of occurring during the life of the 
community. 
 
Another way to view the earthquake threat to Carbondale and Sikeston is to identify all 
the scenarios that would overwhelm or severely strain the capacity of essential facilities, 
and to evaluate the likelihood of each9. These scenarios are summarized in Tables 5-9 
and 5-10.  To evaluate the likelihood, it is useful to think in terms longer than just one 
year.   A viable plan for emergency preparedness should reflect a typical urban planning 
timeframe of 20-30 years. Tables 5-9 and 5-10 show 30-year probabilities for each 
scenario. 
 
Table 5-9       Scenarios Exceeding Capacity of Essential Facilities, Carbondale 
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M 5, 0 km   83 4,358 13.31% 0.002% 0.065% 
M 5, 10 km   87 4,508 19.47% 0.020% 0.588% 
M 5.5, 0 km   77 4,019 6.93% 0.001% 0.025% 
M 5.5, 10 km   84 4,393 10.30% 0.007% 0.224% 
M 6, 0 km 77 40 220 13,409 3.62% 0.000% 0.015% 
M 6, 10 km 55 52 90 4,639 5.32% 0.005% 0.136% 
M 6, 25 km   88 4,606 14.40% 0.018% 0.542% 
M 8, 116 km 236 13    0.018% 0.543% 
M 8, 173 km 115 26    0.018% 0.543% 
M 8, 234 km 50 41    0.018% 0.543% 
M 8, 295 km 20 67    0.018% 0.543% 
     TOTAL 0.125% 3.767% 
                                                 
9 In the case of Carbondale, Tables 4-6 and 4-8 identify the scenarios that would exceed or strain the 
capacity of essential facilities.  For Sikeston, Tables 4-10 and 4-12 identify the scenarios.  One difference 
between them is that HAZUS predicts more fire ignitions in Carbondale.  
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Note: data entries are only for those scenarios and services where capacities will be 
exceeded or severely strained. 
 
Table 5-10       Scenarios Exceeding Capacity of Essential Facilities, Sikeston 
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M 6, 0 km 39 38 20 1003 3.19% 0.000% 0.015% 
M 6, 10 km 30 53    0.005% 0.136% 
M 7, 34 km 78 24    0.046% 1.374% 
M 8, 34 km 334 2 21 1100 0.73% 0.018% 0.543% 
M 8, 63 km 196 9    0.018% 0.543% 
M 8, 122 km 101 24    0.018% 0.543% 
M 8, 184 km 37 76    0.018% 0.543% 
     TOTAL 0.123% 3.697% 
Note: data entries are only for those scenarios and services where capacities will be 
exceeded or severely strained. 
 
From the point of view of emergency services, these scenarios are the most problematic 
for each community.  Fortunately, these scenarios have low individual probabilities; only 
one of them exceeds a 1% probability over 30 years.  However, it is also useful to sum 
the probabilities.  This tells us that Carbondale and Sikeston each have approximately a 
3.7% chance over the next 30 years of experiencing an earthquake that would strain or 
exceed the capacity of some of their essential facilities. 
 
It is clear that each community has a finite chance of experiencing a damaging 
earthquake, although the most severe ones are least likely.  It is clear that some level of 
preparedness is appropriate.  The continuing question is this: which types and magnitudes 
of earthquake consequences should local officials plan for, and what types of actions are 
most appropriate?10 
                                                 
10 Another important source of information is the USGS maps themselves.  The USGS website allows 
users to “deaggregate” the shaking map at any location to reveal all the earthquake sources (magnitudes 
and distances) that compose a given probabilistic shaking value. 
 
For example, for Carbondale, the 224-year (20% chance of being exceeded in 50 years) peak ground 
acceleration is 0.083g.  This is due to a variety of earthquake sources.  Approximately 20% is due to 
earthquakes of about Mw 4.8 within 100 km, 18% is due to earthquakes of about Mw 5.2 within 100 km, 
12% is due to earthquakes of about Mw 5.7 at 50-100 km, 11% is due to earthquakes of about Mw 6.2 
within 115 km, and 21% is due to earthquakes of Mw 8 at about 50-90 km.  So, relatively frequent shaking 
that would be slightly damaging (roughly equal to MMI VI) is due primarily to earthquakes of Mw 5.0-6.0. 
 
The 2475-year (2% chance of being exceeded in 50 years) peak ground acceleration is  0.551g. 
Approximately 64% of this is due to earthquakes of Mw 8.0 at about 50-90 km, and 26% is due to 
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Summary: Characteristics of Seismic Risk 
 
What are the expected earthquake effects in each community?   
 
For both communities, annualized direct economic losses are relatively low, at about 
$500,000 to $600,000 per year, but they are significant over the lifetime of the 
community.  Neither community can expect earthquake to cause many deaths or injuries 
requiring hospitalization (assuming that the HAZUS casualty models are reasonably 
accurate). The greatest risk to Carbondale comes from M 6.0-7.0 events and large M 8.0+ 
events.  The greatest risk to Sikeston comes from earthquakes of M > 7.0.  Each 
community has a 2.8% chance per year of a damaging earthquake, or a 57% chance of 
having a damaging earthquake in a 30-year period.  Each community has a 3.7% chance 
over the next 30 years of experiencing an earthquake that would strain or exceed the 
capacity of some of their essential facilities.  
 
How are the damages and casualties distributed across the community?  
 
This question is answered best in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.  The primary seismic safety 
problem in Carbondale’s building stock consists of residential and educational buildings 
constructed of unreinforced masonry and concrete frames.  SIU buildings account for a 
significant part of this.  The primary seismic safety problem in Sikeston’s building stock 
lies in unreinforced masonry commercial, government, and educational buildings, and 
secondarily reinforced masonry commercial and religious buildings.  In both 
communities, an earthquake during the day would have the greatest number of casualties, 
because workplaces and schools are generally less seismically safe than homes. 
 
 
INTEGRATION OF ATC-21 INVENTORIES WITH HAZUS INVENTORY 
 
Questions regarding integration of ATC-21 inventories with HAZUS: 
 
a. How feasible is it to integrate ATC-21 inventories into HAZUS?  How can 
HAZUS best reflect the intelligence gained by doing local ATC-21 surveys? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
earthquakes of about Mw 5.2 to Mw 6.2 at 12 to 37 km. Thus, relatively infrequent shaking that would be 
highly damaging (roughly equal to MMI IX) is due primarily to earthquakes of Mw 8.0 from the New 
Madrid seismic zone. 
 
Sikeston’s hazard is more clearly dominated by the New Madrid seismic zone, particularly for the higher 
return periods. The 224-year peak ground acceleration is 0.092g, only slightly higher than for Carbondale.  
Approximately 19% is due to earthquakes of about Mw 4.8 within 50 km, 16% due to earthquakes of about 
Mw 5.2 within 65 km, 11% due to earthquakes of about Mw 5.7 within 75 km, 9% due to earthquakes of Mw 
6.2 at 25 to 100 km, and 22% due to earthquakes of Mw 8.0 at 13 to 32 km. The 2475-year peak ground 
acceleration is 1.581g, of which 95% is due to earthquakes of Mw 8.0 at 13 to 32 km. 
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b. How does the ATC-21 information change the output of HAZUS, as 
compared to using default data only?  What is the value added by 
augmenting HAZUS with ATC-21? 
 
HAZUS General Building Stock Inventory 
 
According to the HAZUS manuals, the results are more accurate if an actual building 
inventory is substituted for the default general building stock inventory.  This is easier 
said than done.   
 
The General Building Stock (GBS) module estimates floor area and number of buildings 
for each combination of the 36 structure types and 28 occupancy classes (Technical 
Manual, Chapter 3).  It creates these by combining two sets of inputs. First, it uses a 
variety of available data sources to estimate, for each census tract, the floor area for each 
occupancy class.  Second, in what is called the “occupancy mapping,” it estimates the 
percentage of floor area for structure types within each occupancy class (separate tables 
for low-rise, mid-rise, and high-rise).  HAZUS uses three default occupancy mappings: 
for the West, Midwest, and East.  For single-family dwellings, it has separate mappings 
for each state.11  It combines the default mapping with the occupancy data for the census 
tract to estimate square footage for each of the 1,008 structure-occupancy categories.  
Finally, it applies default parameters for floor area per building, to estimate number of 
buildings in each category.   
 
For damage estimates, HAZUS applies default parameters for: structural repair cost per 
square foot for each of the 1,008 structure-occupancy categories, contents value as 
percentage of replacement value, business sales per square foot, repair time, and income 
per day, rental costs, and several other economic assumptions for each occupancy class. 
The tables of “total dollar exposure” by occupancy and building type appear to have been 
calculated as the total structural and nonstructural replacement costs for each category. 
 
In light of this detailed database structure, there are two ways to apply local knowledge to 
the GBS inventory.  The first is to conduct a complete survey of all community buildings, 
in order to fill out the floor areas for the 1,008 categories.  The second is to change some 
of the parameters, chiefly the occupancy mapping and the repair costs.  But, because of 
the specificity of the categories, this demands comprehensive knowledge of the building 
stock, which is not very different from needing a complete survey.  Alternatively, it 
might be possible to do a random survey in order to develop an appropriate occupancy 
apping scheme. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11For Illinois, it assumes 77% of single-family residences are wood-frame, 1% are concrete shear wall, and 
22% are unreinforced masonry.  For Missouri, it assumes 76% wood-frame and 24% unreinforced 
masonry. 
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Use of ATC-21 Survey to Augment HAZUS GBS Inventory 
 
Because of the labor required, we decided not to modify the GBS default inventory.  
Instead, we chose to use the ATC-21 method to inventory the most significant buildings 
in the two communities. This seemed like a cost-effective way to obtain the most critical 
building information for each community.  Thus, rather than integrate the ATC-21 
inventory into the default analysis, we performed the two analyses in parallel. 
 
The important question is this: What is the value added to the HAZUS analysis by 
performing an ATC-21 survey?  It seems to us that there must be a middle ground 
between relying completely on the default GBS inventory and doing a comprehensive 
inventory of one’s own.  There ought to be some value in augmenting the HAZUS 
defaults with field-collected data on the most important buildings in town.  To answer 
this question, we consider three issues: (1) comparison of the ATC-21 and GBS 
inventories themselves, (2) comparison of the resulting damage estimates, and (3) 
evaluation of value of each method. 
 
Comparison of ATC-21 and GBS inventories 
 
This section compares the GBS and ATC-21 inventories, by occupancy and by structure 
type.  It can show whether the two inventories are consistent with one another, confirm 
whether the GBS default inventory for each community is plausible, and estimate what 
proportion of the building stock is covered by the ATC-21 survey. 
 
Tables 5-11 and 5-12 summarize both inventories for Carbondale, by building occupancy 
type. The ATC-21 survey represents 3.5% of the number of buildings in the GBS, but 
39.0% of the floor area.  This is consistent with our assumption that the ATC-21 survey 
includes the largest buildings in Carbondale. 
 
Given that we know something about Carbondale, as represented by the ATC-21 survey, 
does the default GBS inventory seem plausible?  Put another way: Does the ATC-21 
survey tell us enough to say whether or not the default GBS inventory reasonably 
represents buildings in Carbondale?  For the vast majority of the building stock, 
residential and commercial buildings, the GBS inventory appears to be reasonable.  But 
for the specialized categories for which we tried to survey all buildings in Carbondale–
education, government, and religious–the default inventory appears to underestimate the 
actual amount.  The greatest discrepancies are for general government and for colleges, 
both reflecting the unique nature of Carbondale as a university town, with many 
associated governmental services.  In addition, Carbondale has a large new city hall, 
which is not typical of most towns of this size. 
 
Therefore, the GBS default inventory totals appear to represent the community 
reasonably well, but the ATC-21 inventory is useful in allowing us to focus attention on 
some of the more important buildings in the community, especially those at SIU. 
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Table 5-11 
GBS and ATC-21 Inventories, by Specific Occupancy 
Carbondale 
 GBS (HAZUS Default) ATC-21 Inventory 
Label Occupancy Class Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposur
e ($1,000 
No. of 
Bldgs.  
Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposur
e ($1,000 
No. of 
Bldgs.  
RES1 Single family 7,806 501,083 5,204    
RES2 Mobile home 2,417 109,090 2,417    
RES3 Multi Family 5,798 465,231 362 964 46,892 54 
RES4 Temporary lodging 110 8,920 2 209 9,600 8 
RES5 Dormitory 4,662 374,080 155 1,504 70,170 30 
RES6 Nursing Home 90 6,861 2 271 12,646 6 
COM1 Retail trade 1,225 62,672 86 1,806 166,074 26 
COM2 Wholesale trade 303 10,336 8    
COM3 Personal/repair svcs. 504 34,367 43 303 19,430 21 
COM4 Financial/Professional 684 50,098 19 74 6,199 9 
COM5 Banks 105 12,159 5 38 3,639 4 
COM6 Hospital 42 5,098 0 200 11,000 1 
COM7 Medical Office 246 22,179 20 87 6,095 5 
COM8 Entertainment/Rec. 305 30,867 23 105 7,458 13 
COM9 Theaters 11 803 0 21 1,155 2 
COM10 Parking 0 0 0    
IND1 Heavy Industry  265 13,576 5    
IND2 Light 313 16,017 15 30 1,650 1 
IND3 Food/Drugs/Chem. 5 271 0    
IND4 Metals/Min Process. 0 0 0    
IND5 High Technology 0 0 0    
IND6 Construction 156 7,969 8    
AGRI Agriculture 65 842 4    
REL1 Church 387 33,035 28 273 14,971 38 
GOV1 General Services 66 4,404 1 342 19,665 13 
GOV2 Emergency Response 0 0 0 38 3,965 6 
EDU1 Schools 378 28,063 19 352 19,346 11 
EDU2 Colleges 501 50,220 21 3,709 204,560 47 
 TOTAL 26,443 1,848,239 8,447 10,327 624,258 295 
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Table 5-12 
GBS and ATC-21 Inventories, by General Occupancy 
Carbondale 
 GBS (HAZUS Default) ATC-21 Inventory ATC-21/GBS 
Occupancy Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000 
No. of 
Bldgs.  
Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000 
No. of 
Bldg  
% 
Floor 
Area 
% 
Bldgs  
Commercial 3,425 228,579 204 2,635 221,049 81 76.9 39.7 
Educational 879 78,283 40 4,061 223,880 58 462.0 145.0 
Government 66 4,404 1 380 23,351 19 575.8 1900.0 
Industrial 739 37,833 28 30 1,650 1 4.0 3.6 
Religious 387 33,035 28 273 14,972 38 70.5 135.7 
Residential 20,883 1,465,265 8,142 2,948 139,356 98 14.1 1.2 
TOTAL 26,443 1,848,239 8,447 10,327 624,258 295 39.0 3.5 
 
We can also compare the two inventories by structure type, as shown in Table 5-13.   The 
ATC-21 inventory exceeds the GBS inventory for the following structure types: Steel 
moment frame (S1), steel frame with concrete (S4), concrete moment frame (C1), 
concrete frame with URM infill (C3), pre-cast frames (PC2), and reinforced masonry 
(RM). 
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Table 5-13 
GBS and ATC-21 Inventories by Structure Type  
Carbondale 
 
 GBS (HAZUS Default) ATC-21 Inventory 
Label Structure Type  Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000) 
No. of 
Bldgs.  
Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000) 
No. of 
Bldgs.  
W Wood 12,697 909,560 4,390 1,189 56,837 96 
S1 Steel Moment Frame 150 10,688 7 464 34,401 19 
S2 Steel Braced Frame 315 22,744 16 257 14,135 2 
S3 Steel Light Frame 519 32,633 27 61 3,330 3 
S4 Steel Frame, Concr. 
Shear Walls 
282 17,799 16 525 28,868 2 
S5 Steel Frame, URM 
infill 
346 22,174 19    
C1 Concrete Moment 
Frame 
272 21,853 9 308 16,936 5 
C2 Concrete Shear Walls 1,048 78,950 91 808 37,347 5 
C3 Concrete Frame, URM 
infill 
114 8,522 2 2,905 154,623 47 
PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-
up 
1,353 102,130 51    
PC2 Precast Frames, 
Concrete Shear Walls 
208 16,121 7 236 12,962 1 
RM Reinforced Masonry 406 32,030 20 1,839 175,109 43 
URM Unreinforced Masonry 6,315 463,943 1,374 1,736 89,697 72 
MH Mobile Homes 2,417 109,090 2,417    
TOTAL  26,443 1,848,239 8,446 10,327 624,258 295 
 
 
We can ask the same questions regarding the Sikeston inventories.  Tables 5-14 and 5-15 
summarize both inventories for Sikeston, by building occupancy type. The ATC-21 
survey represents 1.5% of the number of buildings in the GBS, but 17.4% of the floor 
area.  As with Carbondale, this is consistent with our assumption that the ATC-21 survey 
includes the largest buildings in Sikeston. 
 
As was true in Carbondale, for the vast majority of the building stock, residential and 
commercial buildings, the GBS inventory appears to be reasonable.  We tried to 
inventory all educational, governmental, and religious buildings, and, for the most part, 
the two inventories appear to be relatively consistent.  As with Carbondale, the GBS 
inventory seems to underestimate floor area in government buildings.  And it appears that 
the GBS inventory underestimates the amount of industrial space in Sikeston.  As 
Carbondale is a university town, Sikeston is an industrial center, which is not completely 
captured by the default inventory.  
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Table 5-14 
GBS and ATC-21 Inventories, by Specific Occupancy 
Sikeston 
 
 GBS (HAZUS Default) ATC-21 Inventory 
Label Occupancy Class Floor Area 
(1,000 sq. 
ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000 
No. of 
Bldgs  
Floor Area 
(1,000 sq. 
ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000) 
No. of 
Bldgs  
RES1 Single family 10,350 595,498 6900    
RES2 Mobile home 845 34,184 845    
RES3 Multi Family 1,734 124,709 109 331 18,222 9 
RES4 Temporary lodging 137 9,948 2 72 3,974 4 
RES5 Dormitory 402 28,947 13    
RES6 Nursing Home 50 3,444 0 110 6,056 4 
COM1 Retail trade 1,562 71,635 112 339 18,645 4 
COM2 Wholesale trade 1,028 31,427 30 133 7,322 5 
COM3 Personal/repair svcs. 553 33,799 47    
COM4 Financial/Professional 1,021 67,031 29    
COM5 Banks 89 9,270 4 48 2,640 1 
COM6 Hospital 133 14,468 1 292 16,088 4 
COM7 Medical Office 178 14,402 15    
COM8 Entertainment/Rec. 241 21,909 18    
COM9 Theaters 3 206 0    
COM10 Parking 0 0 0    
IND1 Heavy Industry  475 21,778 10    
IND2 Light 156 7,149 8 924 36,982 11 
IND3 Food/Drugs/Chem. 72 3,288 4 343 18,876 8 
IND4 Metals/Min Process. 130 5,961 8    
IND5 High Technology 0 0 0    
IND6 Construction 244 11,186 14    
AGRI Agriculture 193 2,255 14    
REL1 Church 244 18,663 16 324 17,824 35 
GOV1 General Services 46 2,780 0 41 4,477 7 
GOV2 Emergency Response 6 609 1 64 3,520 10 
EDU1 Schools 611 40,627 30 537 29,543 22 
EDU2 Colleges 6 494 0    
 TOTAL 20,510 1,175,671 8,230 3,561 184,140 124 
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Table 5-15 
GBS and ATC-21 Inventories, by General Occupancy 
Sikeston 
 
 GBS (HAZUS Default) ATC-21 Inventory ATC-21/GBS 
Occupancy Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000 
No. of 
Bldgs.  
Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000 
No. 
of 
Bld
g 
% 
Floor 
Area 
% 
Bldgs  
Commercial 4,808 264,147 256 812 44,695 14 16.9 5.5 
Educational 617 41,121 30 537 29,543 22 87.0 73.3 
Government 52 3,389 1 105 7,997 17 201.9 1700.0 
Industrial 1,077 49,362 44 1,267 55,858 19 117.6 43.2 
Agriculture 193 2,255 14 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Religious 244 18,663 16 324 17,824 35 132.8 218.8 
Residential 13,518 796,730 7,869 513 28,252 17 3.8 0.2 
TOTAL 20,510 1,175,671 8,230 3,561 184,140 124 17.4 1.5 
 
 
 
We can also compare the two Sikeston inventories by structure type, as shown in Table 5-
16.   The ATC-21 inventory exceeds the GBS inventory for the following structure types: 
steel moment frame (S1), steel light frame (S3), and reinforced masonry (RM).  For both 
Carbondale and Sikeston, the ATC-21 inventories report significantly more RM than the 
GBS default inventory.  This may reflect a consistent underestimation in the HAZUS 
default.  But it is also true that it is often difficult to distinguish RM from URM by visible 
inspection, as was done in the ATC-21 surveys. 
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Table 5-16 
GBS and ATC-21 Inventories by Structure Type  
Sikeston 
 GBS (HAZUS Default) ATC-21 Inventory 
Label Structure Type  Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000) 
No. of 
Bldgs. 
Floor 
Area 
(1,000 
sq. ft.) 
Dollar 
Exposure 
($1,000) 
No. of 
Bldgs. 
W Wood 10,815 643,447 5,414 380 20,896 13 
S1 Steel Moment 
Frame 
175 9,352 7 401 22,048 18 
S2 Steel Braced 
Frame 
369 20,202 19 88 4,856 1 
S3 Steel Light Frame 756 38,553 38 883 33,112 18 
S4 Steel Frame, 
Concr. Shear 
Walls 
409 20,879 20 0 0 0 
S5 Steel Frame, URM 
infill 
489 24,923 25 70 3,844 3 
C1 Concrete Moment 
Frame 
100 5,763 3 38 2,090 2 
C2 Concrete Shear 
Walls 
521 28,727 25 0 0 0 
C3 Concrete Frame, 
URM infill 
54 2,598 1 52 3,237 4 
PC1 Precast Concrete 
Tilt-up 
617 33,003 26 22 1,240 2 
PC2 Precast Frames, 
Concrete Shear 
Walls 
65 3,471 1 0 0 0 
RM Reinforced 
Masonry 
40 14,806 13 1,344 75,401 46 
URM Unreinforced 
Masonry 
5,053 295,760 1,793 284 17,442 17 
MH Mobile Homes 845 34,184 845 0 0 0 
TOTAL  20,510 1,175,671 8,230 3,561 184,140 124 
 
 
 
Comparison of HAZUS Loss Estimates From the Two Methods  
 
How do the HAZUS loss estimates differ for the two inventories? We applied HAZUS to 
estimate losses to both inventories, but it was necessary to apply two different HAZUS 
modules to the task.  HAZUS uses one method to estimate losses to General Building 
Stock, applying the GBS module to the GBS inventory.  For user-defined structures, one 
must use the User-defined Facilities Module, as described in Chapter 4. 
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These two modules operate in slightly different ways and report their results differently.  
Tables 5-17 and 5-18 summarize the loss estimates using the two methods for both 
Carbondale and Sikeston.  To make them as comparable as possible, this table reports the 
loss estimates for the GBS inventory for the sum of structural and nonstructural direct 
losses only, and the loss estimates for the ATC-21 inventory (using the user-defined 
facilities module) are for building reconstruction costs. 
 
Table 5-17 
Structural and Nonstructural Loss Estimates, GBS and ATC-21 Inventories, 
Carbondale (thousands of 1994 $) 
 
Scenario Loss 
Estimate, 
GBS 
inventory 
Loss 
Estimate, 
ATC-21 
Inventory 
ATC-21 
Loss as 
Proportion 
of GBS Loss 
M5, 0 km 42,755 10,867 25.4%
M5, 10 km 30,254 8,420 27.8%
M5, 25 km 8,206 2,491 30.4%
M5, 50 km 1,039 209 20.1%
M5, 100 km 0 0 NA 
M5.5, 0 km 119,319 34,925 29.3%
M5.5, 10 km 84,783 23,130 27.3%
M5.5, 25 km 35,666 9,600 26.9%
M5.5, 50 km 5,627 1,326 23.6%
M5.5, 100 km 857 137 16.0%
M6, 0 km 237,210 88,674 37.4%
M6, 10 km 184,219 64,109 34.8%
M6, 25 km 260,466 29,570 11.4%
M6, 50 km 20,269 5,889 29.1%
M6, 100 km 4,414 1,060 24.0%
M7, 116 km 36,815 10,183 27.7%
M7, 173 km 15,394 4,319 28.1%
M7, 234 km 5,689 1,603 28.2%
M7, 295 km 2,577 702 27.2%
M8, 116 km 280,764 67,716 24.1%
M8, 173 km 161,821 43,609 26.9%
M8, 234 km 84,847 21,978 25.9%
M8, 295 km 39,682 10,507 26.5%
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Table 5-18 
Structural and Nonstructural Loss Estimates, GBS and ATC-21 Inventories 
Sikeston (thousands of 1994 $) 
 
 
Scenario Loss 
Estimate, 
GBS 
inventory 
Loss 
Estimate, 
ATC-21 
Inventory 
ATC-21 
Loss as 
Proportion 
of GBS 
Loss 
M5, 0 km 19,952 3,505 17.6%
M5, 10 km 14,145 2,510 17.7%
M5, 25 km 3,922 684 17.4%
M5, 50 km 627 96 15.3%
M5, 100 km 0 0 NA
M5.5, 0 km 60,888 8,592 14.1%
M5.5, 10 km 41,086 5,959 14.5%
M5.5, 25 km 18,243 2,767 15.2%
M5.5, 50 km 4,002 605 15.1%
M5.5, 100 km 390 62 15.9%
M6, 0 km 110,912 15,988 14.4%
M6, 10 km 89,083 12,328 13.8%
M6, 25 km 45,585 6,302 13.8%
M6, 50 km 13,142 2,175 16.5%
M6, 100 km 2,110 357 16.9%
M7, 34 km 128,138 17,919 14.0%
M7, 63 km 47,972 7,558 15.8%
M7, 122 km 14,890 2,612 17.5%
M7, 184 km 5,443 910 16.7%
M8, 34 km 363,786 54,127 14.9%
M8, 63 km 201,542 30,319 15.0%
M8, 122 km 111,566 16,333 14.6%
M8, 184 km 49,321 8,948 18.1%
 
 
For both cities, the ratios of  ATC-21 loss estimates to GBS loss estimates are relatively 
consistent among the scenarios.  For Carbondale, the proportions range from 11.4% to 
37.4%, but 18 of the 23 scenarios have proportions in the range of 20% to 30%.  For 
Sikeston, all the scenarios have proportions in the range of 13.8% to 18.1%.  For 
Sikeston, this proportion is relatively consistent with the ATC-21 inventory’s 17.4% 
proportion, by floor area, of the GBS inventory.  For Carbondale, this proportion is less 
than the corresponding floor area proportion of 39.0%. 
 
These tables illustrate a few points.  First, they are not inconsistent with our assumption 
that the ATC-21 inventory represents a subset of the overall building inventory in each 
community.  Second, they are consistent with our assumption that, although the ATC-21 
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inventory represents a small sample of the number of buildings in each community, it 
represents the largest buildings and therefore a significant proportion of the overall 
building floor area in the community.  Third, they show that by accomplishing an ATC-
21 inventory according to the criteria we used, we are able to evaluate buildings that 
represent about 15% to 30% of the community’s direct economic losses in an earthquake. 
 
Value of Conducting an ATC-21 Survey 
 
Conducting an ATC-21 survey of significant buildings complements the default HAZUS 
analysis in several ways:   
 
· The act of performing the survey allows one to become more familiar with the 
potential vulnerability of key buildings.  
 
· As shown in Chapter 2, there are many ways to use an ATC-21 survey to analyze 
the vulnerability of building stock, even without performing HAZUS loss 
estimates.   
 
· The ATC-21 inventory provides a useful, albeit imperfect, calibration check on 
the structural and occupancy categories in the default General Building Stock 
inventory in HAZUS.  
 
· By selecting appropriate buildings, it is feasible to conduct an ATC-21 survey of 
the most significant buildings in a community, about 2% to 4% of the total 
number of buildings.  In doing so, it is possible to account for approximately 15% 
to 30% or more of the total floor area and total potential direct economic damage 
in the community.   
 
· One can use the user-defined module of HAZUS to perform loss estimates of the 
ATC-21 inventory.  Such estimates provide a complement to the default analyses 
of the GBS module.  Because of the inherent uncertainties in loss estimation, 
additional forms of estimation can add depth to the overall ana lysis.   
 
· Such loss estimates provide the opportunity to perform more detailed assessments 
of specific classes of significant buildings.   
 
· The key buildings in the ATC-21 inventory have more importance than can be 
measured by direct economic damages.  Some are essential facilities, needed to 
respond to disasters.  Some are important symbols. All are critical to the 
functioning of the community. 
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Summary of ATC-21/HAZUS Integration 
 
How feasible is it to integrate ATC-21 inventories into HAZUS?   
 
It is quite easy to apply HAZUS loss estimation to an ATC-21 inventory of buildings, 
using the User-defined Facilities module.  This allows the user to focus the loss estimate 
on an actual set of buildings of interest in the community.  In this case, we were able to 
obtain loss estimates for the most significant buildings in each community.  If we chose, 
we also could have calculated subtotals by occupancy and structure types. 
 
What is the value added by augmenting HAZUS with ATC-21? 
 
This question assumes that it is normally difficult to perform an ATC-21 survey of all the 
buildings in a community. We found that the default inventories appear to represent the 
community reasonably well, in the aggregate.  Thus, HAZUS loss estimates of default 
data can give community-wide loss estimates, whereas the ATC-21 survey allows one to 
focus on key buildings.  Both approaches are useful.  We found that it is feasible to 
conduct an ATC-21 survey of the most significant buildings in a community, 
representing about 2% to 4% of the total number of buildings.  By picking the largest 
buildings, this method accounts for approximately 15% to 30% of the total floor area and 
of the potential direct economic damage in the community. 
 
 
USE OF HAZUS IN MID-AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 
 
Questions regarding use of HAZUS: 
 
a. How easy is HAZUS to use?  What are the hardware, software, and 
operator requirements?  How appropriate is it for use by communities in 
Mid-America? 
 
b. Does HAZUS give plausible results? (It has not yet been tested in this 
part of the country). 
 
c. How sensitive is HAZUS to the inputs of vulnerability and hazard? 
 
Feasibility of Using HAZUS 
 
HAZUS is designed for desktop computers with typical hardware characteristics.  For 
example, the newest version (released in early 2002), HAZUS 99 SR-2, is recommended 
for a Pentium 800MHz or better, with at least 128 MB of RAM.  Although HAZUS is 
free, it requires the user to purchase MapInfo or ArcView.  Both of these are relatively 
common geographic information system software in many municipal and county offices.  
On the other hand, smaller offices are less likely to have the software or the capability to 
acquire and learn it. 
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As a test of transferability, we set up HAZUS in the Community Development 
Department in the City of Urbana, Illinois, and we trained one of the planning staff 
members in its use.  Although quite feasible, this required some effort and expense.  
Because HAZUS has very specific requirements regarding which versions of Windows 
and ArcView it operates on, Urbana had to purchase a computer solely dedicated to 
running HAZUS.  Secondly, because a comprehensive HAZUS study is time-consuming, 
Urbana needed to hire one of our students (previously trained on HAZUS on another 
MAE Center project) to perform the analysis. 
 
Based on this experience, we believe that it is feasible for medium-sized communities in 
Mid-America to acquire, learn, and use HAZUS to analyze their earthquake risk.  But 
such an effort should not be taken lightly.  It could require several thousand dollars of 
hardware and software, as well as a time commitment for training and for performing the 
analysis. Although a few trial HAZUS runs can be performed in a matter of a few hours, 
a comprehensive effort would require approximately 100 to 200 hours of staff time.  
 
We also note that we encountered some difficulties with using HAZUS, which added 
significantly to the labor time.  We hope many of these issues will be resolved in future 
versions of the software. 
 
FEMA and states could facilitate the use of HAZUS by providing more opportunities for 
local training sessions and more reliable technical support.  Future versions of HAZUS 
would be more usable if designed to run on a variety of Windows operating systems as 
well as previous versions of ArcView and MapInfo.  It would also be helpful to issue 
updates to allow previous HAZUS versions to run on new releases of ArcView and 
MapInfo.  Finally, states should consider ways to provide assistance for consortia of 
smaller communities to perform loss estimates and risk analyses using HAZUS. 
 
Plausibility of Results 
 
Limitations of HAZUS 
 
The “Message to Users” preceding the HAZUS User’s Manual (NIBS, 1999,  gives 
several warnings relevant to this study: 
 
(1) “...the losses from small magnitude (less than M 6.0) earthquakes appear to be 
overestimated.” 
 
(2) “Uncertainty related to the characteristics of ground motion in the Eastern U.S. is 
high.  Conservative treatment of this uncertainty may lead to overestimation of 
losses in this area, particularly for buildings and infrastructure located close to the 
projected earthquake source.” 
 
Communication with one of the developers of HAZUS confirmed that for earthquake 
events smaller than M 5.5, the default HAZUS results tend to overestimate damages 
(Jawhar Bouabid, personal communication, April 10, 2001).  This was confirmed by the 
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M5.0 June 18, 2002 earthquake, which occurred approximately 10 miles from Evansville, 
Indiana, but caused only some cracked chimneys and broken glass in that city. 
 
Thus, we know that the results reported herein are uncertain, and that they probably 
overestimate damage from small earthquakes and from nearby earthquakes.  The 
difficulty, of course, is that we do not know the extent of the overestimation, and we 
cannot truly know how well HAZUS estimates losses for the Central and Eastern U.S. 
until we have a moderate or large earthquake in this region in modern times. 
 
According to a recent study on uncertainty in HAZUS conducted for Oakland, California 
(Grossi, 2000), the ranking of factors that HAZUS outputs (direct economic loss 
estimates) are sensitive to is “(1) ground attenuation function, (2) earthquake recurrence, 
(3) residential inventory exposure, (4) soils mapping scheme/structural fragility before 
mitigation, and (5) structural fragility after mitigation (p. 203). This is instructive, 
although the work by Grossi is not fully comparable to our study because of the 
seismological difference in the West Coast and Mid-America. 
 
In addition, according to the HAZUS user manual (NIBS, 1999a), certain outputs by 
HAZUS are not quite reliable. Specifically, these outputs include: 
 
1. Consequences of M = 6 or M = 7.5 earthquakes, because the implications of very 
short and very long durations of ground motions upon damage are poorly 
understood. 
 
2. Results for non-structural damage because coefficients for non-structural damage 
are based upon less complete data than that of structures. 
 
3. Casualty results, because coefficients for casualty estimates are based primarily 
upon damage from earthquake events that occurred in suburban areas at times of 
the day when people were generally not occupying commercial structures.  
 
Consequently, as mentioned in the HAZUS user manual (NIBS, 1999a), HAZUS outputs 
should not be regarded as a precise prediction but rather as an indication of what the 
future may hold. This is particularly true in Mid-America where seismicity is poorly 
understood.  
 
Sources of Uncertainty 
 
Risk analysis is a highly uncertain enterprise, particularly when it concerns unfamiliar 
phenomena such as earthquakes in Mid-America.  Use of HAZUS has considerable 
uncertainty even in California, which has much more complete seismic risk models, 
based on more substantial earthquake experience than in Mid-America (Grossi, 2000). 
   
Our analysis contains several sources of uncertainty: in knowledge of earthquake hazard 
in Mid-America, in the building inventories, in the structure damage functions, in the 
models within HAZUS, and in our application of HAZUS.  The chief sources of 
uncertainty are detailed below.   
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First, the hazard itself is poorly understood, as discussed in Chapter 3 and earlier in 
Chapter 5.  Johnston and Nava (1985) assume standard deviations of 21% to 24% of their 
estimates of average earthquake recurrence intervals.  For smaller earthquakes farther 
away from the New Madrid seismic zone, such as near Carbondale, the standard 
deviations could be much greater.   
 
Second, knowledge of ground-shaking attenuation (the decay of ground-shaking by its 
distance from the epicenter) in Mid-America is very poor.  Attenuation models in this 
part of the country are based on a few small earthquakes and on qualitative reports of 
shaking from the 1811-1812 events.  In HAZUS, we used the “Project 97 East Coast” 
attenuation function, which is a USGS-derived average of the two other attenuation 
functions offered by HAZUS (Frankel, 1996; and Toro, Abrahamson, and Schneider, 
1997).  These three HAZUS attenuation functions predict ground motions quite 
differently. Table 5-19 presents an example illustrating the effect of attenuation function 
on M8 HAZUS loss estimates, and Figure 5-5 illustratively compares these results. As 
both show, assuming other conditions unchanged and using default inputs in HAZUS, the 
Frankel (1996) attenuation function predicts the highest direct economic losses in 
Carbondale while the Toro et al (1997) attenuation function predicts the lowest.  
Compared to our estimates using Project 97 East Coast, the Frankel attenuation function 
would produce loss estimates 28% higher for closer events up to 230% higher for more 
distant M8 events.  Conversely, the Toro et al attenuation function would produce loss 
estimates lower than ours by 37% for closer M8 events and 78% for the more distant 
ones. This example demonstrates that HAZUS outputs are very sensitive to the cho ice of 
a HAZUS attenuation function. Furthermore, it is not possible to judge which attenuation 
function best simulates the actual characteristics of potential ground motions because 
little historical seismic evidence exists in Mid-America.   
 
Table 5-19 Direct economic losses for default GBS inventory by attenuation function 
(thousands 1994 $), Carbondale 
Scenario Frankel (1996) Project 97 East Coast 
Toro, Abrahamson 
& Schneider (1997) Range 
M8, 116 km 576,964 449,912 284,609 292,355 
M8, 173 km 452,035 266,862 122,796 329,239 
M8, 234 km 270,405 143,447 44,130 226,275 
M8, 295 km 162,771 69,917 15,229 147,542 
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Comparison of Attenuation Functions
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Figure 5-5.  Comparison of the three attenuation functions in HAZUS (Carbondale 
M8 scenarios) 
 
Third, the default inventory is an imperfect representation of each community. Default 
inventories in HAZUS are from publicly available databases and aggregated on a county 
or census tract scale. Many of these databases are either out of date, overly generalized, 
or inaccurate. In addition, such databases do not capture data characteristics of a specific 
community that may have a wide variety of ages, sizes, shapes, and structural systems of 
buildings constructed under diverse seismic design codes. To address these issues, 
HAZUS has to make some general assumptions (NIBS, 1999a). For example, the default 
general building stock inventory in HAZUS in the Carbondale case was created based 
upon an assumption that Carbondale is a typical Midwest community, even though it is 
atypical because it is a university town. As a result, Carbondale has considerably more 
educational and governmental buildings than assumed by the HAZUS default. 
 
Fourth, the models within HAZUS of building response to shaking are based on a limited 
number of earthquakes, most of which occurred in California.  Thus, the building 
vulnerability estimates contain significant uncertainty.  Limited data and available 
theories are used to estimate default parameters in order to establish relationships 
between a few key features of ground shaking and average damage and associated losses 
for each category. These default parameters are calibrated by using historical seismic 
evidence collected in the Western U.S.  Because historical records of seismic damage in 
Mid-America are insufficient, however, the default parameters are not calibrated for Mid-
America. 
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Fifth, casualty estimates are particularly uncertain (National Institute of Building 
Sciences, 1999a), because data are not available across all building types, and injury data 
are not of high quality.   Even less certain, because of insufficient data from, are the 
models of functionality of essential facilities and the models of fire following earthquake. 
 
Sixth, we accepted the HAZUS default for soil conditions.  Variations in site soils can 
affect the amplitude of ground motions significantly. As an example, Table 5-20 presents 
the sensitivity of HAZUS outputs to the choice of on-site soil type, and Figure 5-6 
illustratively compares five soil types defined by HAZUS (NIBS, 1999a).  As both show, 
assuming other conditions unchanged and using default inputs in HAZUS and the 
attenuation function “Project 97 East Coast”, HAZUS outputs are very sensitive to soil 
type, and softer soils tend to amplify certain frequencies within the ground shaking, 
resulting in greater damage.  Specifically, if parts of our study areas have firmer Type C 
soils, they would have about 36% to 61% less economic loss than calculated for Type D 
soil.  Conversely if parts of our study areas have softer Type E soils, they would have 
about 70% to 200% more economic loss than calculated for Type D soil.   
 
Table 5-20.   Direct economic losses for default GBS inventory by soil type 
(thousands 1994 $), Carbondale 
 
Scenario 
Type A 
Hard 
Rock 
Type B 
Rock 
Type C 
Very 
Dense 
Soil 
Type D 
Stiff Soil 
Type E 
Soft Soil 
Range 
M8, 116 km 83,966 143,316 286,275 449,912 759,558 675,592 
M8, 173 km 41,690 71,096 145,815 266,862 579,301 537,611 
M8, 234 km 17,737 33,394 63,106 143,447 369,804 352,067 
M8, 295 km 7,062 15,516 27,031 69,917 213,412 206,350 
Note: Attenuation function is “Project 97 East Coast”, and other inputs are default. Soil 
types from NIBS (1999a).  
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Comparison of Soil Types
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Figure 5-6.   Comparison of five soil types in HAZUS (Carbondale M8 scenarios). 
 
Since our analysis was completed, the CUSEC State Geologists completed soil 
amplification mapping of the area around the New Madrid seismic zone, including 
Carbondale and Sikeston (Bauer et al, 2001).  According to their map, Sikeston is 
underlain by very soft, potentially liquefiable Type F soils.  This means that Sikeston 
probably would have on the order of twice or more economic loss than we estimated, 
using the HAZUS default of Type D soil.   
 
Similarly, the CUSEC State Geologists’ map shows Carbondale as likely underlain by 
Type C or Type B soils.  This means that Carbondale probably would have on the order 
of one-third to one-half the economic loss that we estimated, using the HAZUS default of 
Type D soil.   
 
Limitations of the Annualized Loss Model 
 
In addition to the uncertainties detailed above, our annualized loss model makes several 
simplifying assumptions in order to use 23 earthquakes to represent a continuum of all 
possible earthquakes to strike Carbondale and Sikeston.  It is difficult to say whether this 
simplified hazard model systematically overestimates or underestimates the true risk.   
 
With regard to using one scenario to represent a broad magnitude range, each scenario 
represents a set of earthquakes that are larger–but less probable–than itself.  Given that 
risk equals the product of damage times probability, the question is which effect is 
greater: the decrease in probability with magnitude or the increase in damage cost with 
magnitude?  Our risk estimates indicate that the latter is the greater effect, and thus this 
aspect of our model probably underestimates the true risk. For example, using the 
damage from a M 5.5 event to represent all earthquakes between M 5.5 and M 6.0 
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probably underestimates the true risk of this range of earthquakes.  This is because for 
earthquakes larger than M 5.5 (e.g. 5.8) the product of probability times damage is 
greater than for M 5.5. 
 
With regard to the simplification of earthquake locations into a discrete set of five 
distances, systematic bias is less apparent.  Because each scenario is at the distance 
midpoint (though, admittedly, not the area midpoint) of the range of earthquakes it 
represents, it will underestimate risk for some while overestimating for others.  We have 
not had the opportunity to analyze any systematic effects of this aspect of our model, but 
we assume it is small. 
 
Given all the assumptions in our risk model, it seems likely that, if there is any systematic 
bias, the earthquake hazard part of our model probably leads to underestimation of the 
true risk.  Based on this aspect alone, we estimate that the true risks may be 10% to 60% 
greater than our model’s estimates.  But this must be considered in the context of other 
uncertainties, such as soil variations, higher frequencies of large events (based on recent 
paleoseismic work), and HAZUS’ substantial overestimation of damage from moderate 
earthquakes in Mid-America. 
 
Alternative Risk Analysis Method:  HAZUS Probabilistic Loss Option 
 
HAZUS also has the capability to estimate probabilistic losses, based on USGS 
probabilistic shaking maps. Using the USGS maps, it estimates losses that would occur 
from groundshaking intensities with return periods of 100, 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1500, 
2000, and 2500 years.   
 
We chose not to use this approach because it is less accessible to lay users and less useful 
for scenario planning.  Still, it is an equally valid approach, and its results provide another 
piece of information to help Carbondale and Sikeston in understanding their earthquake 
risk.   
 
We used HAZUS to compute probabilistic losses for Carbondale and Sikeston (Table 5-
21). HAZUS also uses these values to estimate annualized losses.  These totals for 
Sikeston and Carbondale are approximately double our estimates. This reflects at least 
two reasons.  First, as discussed above, our method probably underestimates total risk, 
such that true risk may be about 10% to 60% greater.  Second, the USGS maps use a 
different hazard probability model, based on a variety of sources.  The annualized results 
from these two methods help to further illustrate some of the range of uncertainty in 
estimating long-term earthquake losses in Mid-America. 
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Table 5-21     Probabilistic and Annualized Losses from HAZUS 
Return Period Direct Losses to Buildings (1994 $1,000) 
 Carbondale  Sikeston 
100 years $14,582 $3,920 
250 years $63,612 $29,940 
500 years $187,599 $108,369 
750 years $321,108 $227,491 
1000 years $416,143 $363,558 
1500 years $558,406 $675,485 
2000 years $681,239 $955,745 
2500 years $790,599 $1,110,617 
ANNUALIZED $1,288 $1,163 
 
 
Summary of Use of HAZUS 
 
How easy is HAZUS to use by communities in Mid-America? 
 
As a test of transferability, we set up HAZUS in the Community Development 
Department in the City of Urbana, Illinois.  Based on this experience, we believe that it is 
feasible for medium-sized communities in Mid-America to acquire, learn, and use 
HAZUS to analyze their earthquake risk.  But such an effort should not be taken lightly.  
It could require several thousand dollars of hardware and software, and a comprehensive 
effort would require approximately 100 to 200 hours of staff time, following initial 
training.  We also recommend that FEMA offer more opportunities for local training, 
more reliable technical support, and the capability to run HAZUS on a variety of 
Windows operating systems and several releases of ArcView and MapInfo software. 
 
Does HAZUS give plausible results? 
 
We believe that the HAZUS results are plausible, in the sense that they are a reasonable 
indication of what the future may hold (to use the words of the HAZUS User Manual).  
But some aspects are less reliable than others, because of limited data from previous 
earthquakes.  For Mid-America, the User Manual warns that HAZUS overestimates 
losses from M < 6.0 earthquakes, and probably also overestimates losses from 
earthquakes close to the study area.  In addition, HAZUS is limited by the lack of data for 
M > 7.5 earthquakes, nonstructural losses, and casualties. 
 
How sensitive is HAZUS to the inputs of vulnerability and hazard? 
 
HAZUS is highly sensitive to all of the vulnerability and hazard inputs. Regarding 
vulnerability, we were not able to test the sensitivity of HAZUS to this, although it is 
obvious that the results directly follow from the input inventories.  If an inventory 
overestimates the total floor area of buildings, or the proportion of poor quality buildings, 
then the HAZUS loss estimates would reflect this.   
 
Evaluating Earthquake Risk in Mid-American Communities 
107 
With respect to hazard, we looked at the sensitivity of our results by attenuation function, 
soil type, and earthquake probabilities.  HAZUS outputs are highly sensitive to the choice 
of attenuation function; for example, compared to our estimates using Project 97 East 
Coast, the Frankel attenuation function would produce loss estimates 28% higher for 
closer events up to 230% higher for more distant M8 events.  Furthermore, based on 
existing data, there is no way to know which attenuation function is most appropriate.  
Regarding soils, if parts of our study areas have firmer or softer soils than the mean Type 
D we selected, they could have as little as 39% or as much as 300% of the economic loss 
that we estimated.  Regarding earthquake probabilities, our own assessment suggests that 
our method underestimates risk such that true risk may be about 10% to 60% greater. The 
USGS probabilistic model suggests risk about 100% greater than our estimate. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
What have we learned about earthquake risk in Mid-America communities, and what are 
the implications for local mitigation and preparedness actions?  How might earthquakes 
affect cities in Mid-America, and how likely are such earthquakes to occur in our 
lifetimes and the lifetimes of the communities?  In addressing these questions, we 
performed a variety of different types of analyses, all aimed at understanding the 
potential effects of earthquakes on people, structures, and essential services.  This report 
presents an often-dizzying array of tables, diagrams, and calculations to provide different 
ways of looking at the problem.  Here we try to summarize the major factual findings and 
their implications. 
 
ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. The earthquake threat is real, with a finite chance of a damaging earthquake 
within the next 20 to 50 years.  Economic damage is likely to occur, and life-
endangering events have a finite chance of occurring during the life of the 
community. 
 
The expected annual direct loss is approximately $500,000 for Carbondale, and 
$600,000 for Sikeston.  This translates into $10 to $30 million for each 
community over the next 20 to 50 years.  The full economic effects on the 
communities would be much greater.   
 
Each community has a 2.8% chance per year of experiencing a damaging 
earthquake.  This translates to a 44% to 76% chance of a damaging earthquake 
over the next 20 to 50 years. 
 
 
2. Significant risk is represented by both low frequency/high consequence 
events (e.g., M8+ and M7) and higher frequency/lower consequence events 
(e.g., M5.5 and M6).  It is difficult to make definitive conclusions regarding 
which type of risk is most important. 
 
The greatest economic risk to Carbondale comes from M 6.0-7.0 and M8.0+ 
events.  In Sikeston, it is the largest earthquakes (M > 7.0) that represent most of 
the annualized losses. 
 
Smaller earthquakes pose a threat, because they are relatively more likely to 
occur.  For example, M < 6.0 earthquakes are expected to affect Carbondale every 
20 years, and would cause, on average, $2 to $5 million in damage over the next 
20 to 50 years. 
 
Even large earthquakes, though rare, have a finite chance of occurring over the 
next 20 to 50 years.  For example, although a M > 7.0 earthquake is expected to 
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occur, on average, every 389 years, it has a 12% chance of occurring over the next 
50 years.  Such an event could cause significant damage and injuries in Sikeston 
in particular. 
 
3. Life safety does not appear to be a major concern, except in the largest, 
rarest earthquakes. This statement, however, needs to be tempered with the 
understanding that the casualty estimation model in HAZUS is currently based on 
limited data. 
 
Even over a 70-year life span, Carbondale would expect to have seven injuries 
needing hospitalization and 0.6 deaths (this could be read as “60% chance of one 
death”), and Sikeston would have 12 injuries requiring hospitalization and 1.3 
deaths.  In both communities, the M 8.0+ earthquakes represent the greatest risk 
to human life. 
 
Our analysis of two typical SIU dormitories suggests that it is unlikely that they 
will have any earthquake-related casualties during their lifetime, assuming that 
they are of typical construction quality. 
 
4. There is a small, but finite, chance that vital services will be overwhelmed.  
 
In both Carbondale and Sikeston, several of the scenarios predict straining or 
exceeding the capacity of hospitals or emergency services to respond.  For each 
community, there is approximately a 2.5% to 6.0% chance that such an event 
could occur in the next 20 to 50 years. 
 
Although the chances are relatively small, the probability is much greater than 
zero, and the consequences of such an event would be unacceptable. 
 
5. According to the ATC-21 building surveys, a number of buildings in each 
community warrant further inspection. 
 
Of the 295 buildings surveyed in Carbondale, 151 of them (51%) have ATC-21 
scores less than or equal to 2.0, which means they require further inspection.  
Education is the occupancy category with the greatest amount of floor space in 
low-scoring buildings.  This reflects both the high proportion of unreinforced 
masonry in the public schools as well as the high proportion of concrete-frame 
buildings at Southern Illinois University   
 
Of the 124 buildings surveyed in Sikeston, 69 of them (56%) have scores less 
than or equal to 2.0.  These represent 44% of the floor area in the inventory.  All 
occupancy categories contain significant amounts of low-scoring buildings. 
Educational, religious, and government buildings all have greater than two-thirds 
of their floor space in low-scoring buildings. 
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Vulnerable structure types in the two study areas include unreinforced masonry, 
reinforced masonry, and concrete frame; which are common among important 
educational, governmental, residential, and commercial buildings in the two 
communities studied. 
 
Although HAZUS analysis indicates that these buildings probably do not pose life 
safety risks, this assumes that they are of at least average construction quality.  
Given the level of earthquake hazard in Mid-America, it would seem prudent to 
inspect these buildings, especially high occupancy buildings and those that 
provide essential services. 
 
6. Most medium-sized communities should be able to acquire, learn, and use 
HAZUS to analyze their earthquake risk.   
 
Such an effort, however, should not be taken lightly.  Earthquake-prone 
communities would benefit from having in-house capability to run HAZUS on 
desktop computers.  This may require an investment of several thousand dollars in 
hardware and software, if appropriate hardware and GIS software are not already 
in the office.  It would also require some initial training, and a comprehensive risk 
analysis would require approximately 100 to 200 hours of staff time. 
 
7. Most medium-sized communities have the capability to perform an ATC-21 
survey of the most important buildings in town. 
 
The survey requires 30 minutes or less per building, and can easily be performed 
by appropriate city staff.  The method is easy to learn for those in building-related 
fields.  By selecting appropriate buildings, it is feasible to survey the most 
significant buildings in town, about 2% to 4% of the total number of buildings.  
This can account for approximately 15% to 30% of the total floor area and 
potential direct economic damage in the community. 
 
Performing the survey provides many benefits, such as: gaining familiarity with 
vulnerability of key buildings, identifying buildings and building types most in 
need of further attention, and supplementing HAZUS with structure-specific 
analyses of key buildings. 
 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In deciding how to best use this information, local officials, property owners, and facility 
managers need to consider several key points.  First, they need to think in an appropriate 
time frame.  Although many of us generally think in terms of one budget year (or month) 
at a time, it is important to consider the risk that earthquakes pose to the longer-term 
lifetime of the community.  Prudent decisions would consider expected consequences 
over the next 20 to 50 years.  Second, they need to consider the potential consequences of 
earthquakes.  Are the threats to property or lives?  What types of property?  What about 
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special needs populations, such as the elderly and children?  Would damage to 
infrastructure and essential facilities have potential far-reaching consequences?  Third, 
they need to consider what they can feasibly accomplish.  It is easier, for example, to 
construct new buildings according to seismic design principles than it is to retrofit 
existing buildings. 
 
Communities need to balance the costs of achieving seismic safety—including monetary 
costs, time, and labor—against the benefits to be achieved, in full recognition of the 
characteristics of seismic risk in their location.  The following list, appropriate to the 
level of seismic risk in Mid-America, identifies feasible actions that all communities in 
this area should take, in priority order. 
 
1. At a minimum, communities in Mid-America must be prepared to respond to 
future earthquakes.   
 
Because risks are posed by earthquakes of all magnitudes, communities should 
prepare to respond to the largest (M 8.0+) events.  Although it may seem odd to 
prepare for an event of low likelihood, this is the best way to ensure preparedness 
for the broad range of earthquakes that could occur. 
 
2. Adoption and enforcement of current seismic building codes is the best way 
to ensure the safety of all buildings constructed from today into the future. 
 
In the long run, constructing new buildings to be earthquake resistant will lead to 
communities that are earthquake resistant.  It is far easier to ensure the quality of 
new buildings than to discover a need to retrofit them later on.  All the national 
model building codes, now integrated into the International Building Code, have 
seismic provisions developed through national consensus processes of engineers 
and building officials.  They are also based on the latest USGS seismic hazard 
maps.  These codes are widely used, inexpensive, and widely accepted as the 
standard of practice for new buildings.  Even so, not all communities have 
adopted them, and not all communities implement them effectively.  Adopting 
and enforcing these codes will ensure that all new buildings are as earthquake-
resistant as possible.   
 
3. Communities should inspect all potential high-risk, high-occupancy, high-
importance buildings to verify their worthiness to withstand seismic shaking.   
 
An important first step to minimizing risk is to identify existing high-risk 
structures.  Our study has shown the feasibility and efficacy of performing an 
ATC-21 rapid visual survey of important structures.  Based on these results, 
communities can arrange for structural inspections of potential high-risk 
structures.  This information can then become the basis for establishing priorities 
for strengthening or replacement. 
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4. Strengthening efforts should focus on essential facilities and other key uses. 
 
Although life safety appears to be a minimal risk, our analysis estimates a 6% 
chance of an earthquake straining or exceeding the capacity of hospitals or 
emergency services to respond in each community sometime during the next 50 
years.  The consequences of such an event would be unacceptable. 
 
For other uses, where economic damage is the only risk, owners may be more 
willing to wait until the end of the economic life of older buildings before 
replacing them.  As long as their replacements follow modern seismic design 
requirements, this is another—albeit incremental--way of ensuring that seismic 
safety improves over the next 20 to 50 years. 
 
 
In conclusion, this research illustrates the characteristics and magnitude of seismic risk to 
communities in Mid-America.  It also demonstrates methods appropriate for 
accomplishing such an analysis. 
 
This study takes an important step in describing the earthquake risk characteristics of two 
typical Mid-American communities.  It describes the types of buildings at risk and 
estimates the probabilities of damaging events. Although earthquakes are relatively 
infrequent, they have a finite chance of inflicting significant harm.   
 
The study underscores the need for a prudent level of mitigation and preparedness in 
Mid-America.  It also demonstrates how local officials can use HAZUS and ATC-21 to 
assess the vulnerabilities and risks in their own communities. 
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APPENDIX A 
FIELD MANUAL 
 
Rapid Visual Screening (ATC-21) of Buildings in Carbondale, Illinois 
Mid-America Earthquake Center Project SE-5 
 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Department of Urban and Regional Planning 
October 1998 
 
We will be adding to work previously performed by engineering students under contract 
to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA).  In 1992 they surveyed 
government, health care, educational, religious, and fraternal organization buildings in 
Carbondale.  They were particularly interested in buildings that could be used for 
emergency shelters after an earthquake.  For consistency, we will use their coding system 
and their field methods.  This Manual is based on theirs, which was developed after 
several years of experience with ATC-21. 
 
Structures to be Surveyed 
 
Based on IEMA=s experience, each person can expect to survey 15-20 buildings per day.  
This will vary, depending on the types and sizes of buildings, but the average should be 
15-20 buildings per day.  
 
Our priorities are as follows (codes are from IEMA=s Building Use Codes, attached): 
 
PRIORITY 1 
 
41  Hospitals 
4B  Police/sheriff station 
48  Fire station 
21 Elementary school 
22 Junior/senior high or preparatory school 
23 College/university building 
 
11 Apartment/hotel (of 10 dwelling units or more) 
12 Dormitory (of 10 dwelling units or more) 
14 Motel (of 10 dwelling units or more) 
16 Nursing/convalescent home 
 
43 Public utility 
44 Communications facility 
45 Government office 
46 Jail/prison 
49 Other government/public service 
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31 Church/synagogue 
71 Theater/auditorium 
72 Community center 
76 Senior Citizens center 
 
PRIORITY 2 
 
42 Health care clinic 
52 Food store (larger than 5,000 square feet) 
53 Other stores (larger than 5,000 square feet) 
51 Office (larger than 5,000 square feet) 
55 Bank/financial institution (larger than 5,000 square feet) 
56 Restaurant/snack bar/cafeteria (larger than 5,000 square feet) 
26 Library or museum 
27 Gymnasium 
 
81 Railroad terminal/station 
82 Bus terminal/station 
83 Airport terminal/station 
 
Plus any other high-occupancy buildings 
 
PRIORITY 3 
 
54 Warehouse 
57 Building supply/hardware store 
61 Factory/plant/manufacturing center 
62 Food processing plant 
69 Other industrial 
 
Plus any other buildings of significant size, function, or occupancy (see Building Use 
Codes to see if they have a classification).  
 
For all buildings previously surveyed by IEMA, you must verify their location and condition, 
and should take photographs for our records.  Verification of these buildings should take less 
than five minutes each. 
 
Over 12 field days, two people should be able to survey 360 to 480 buildings.  This should cover 
all of the Priority 1 and Priority 2 buildings, as well as many, if not most, of the Priority 3 
buildings. 
 
Contacting Building Representatives 
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When you arrive at a facility, you should attempt to talk to someone about the building.  
If there is no one available to talk with, you must make a judgment.  If you can easily 
determine the necessary data from the exterior of the building and/or if the building is 
relatively small, then you can gather the data based only on exterior visual inspection.  If 
the building is large or is an essential facility, then you should make further attempts to 
talk to someone.  If someone in a building asks you to return and talk with another 
person, you should return to talk with this other person, unless it will be excessively 
inconvenient or you can gather the necessary data based on your visual inspection.  We 
do not want to create any problems between the building owner and the University or 
City of Carbondale.   
 
SAMPLE INTRODUCTION 
 
AHello, my name is ______________, and I=m from the University of Illinois in Urbana-
Champaign.  We=re gathering information on significant buildings in Carbondale that 
could be affected by an earthquake in southern Illinois.  I would like to ask you a few 
general questions about the building and spend a few minutes looking at the interior and 
exterior.@ 
 
BE PROFESSIONAL 
 
Look presentable.  Use a clipboard.  Wear a badge, showing the name of the University 
and Department, with your name typed on it.  You will also carry several copies of a 
letter, explaining the project, and inviting them to call us or the City for further 
information. 
 
IF THEY WANT TO KNOW MORE 
 
Give them a copy of the letter.  Be cooperative in answering their questions.  Tell them 
that this is being done by the University to assist the City of Carbondale.  Tell them that, 
although the City is not performing the work, they endorse our efforts and will use the 
results to help in earthquake preparedness planning.  Tell them that we will use the 
information gathered from several hundred buildings in order to estimate damages and 
casualties from a future earthquake near Carbondale.  Refer them to our Department for 
further information. 
 
IF THEY DENY YOU ACCESS TO THE BUILDING 
 
Thank them for their time, and leave.  At minimum, you should be able to do an exterior 
inspection.  It is, of course, perfectly legal to stand on a public sidewalk, public street, or 
other public space and inspect a building.  Still, if their objection is strong, it is best to 
walk away.  The bottom line is this: we cannot afford to antagonize anyone to the extent 
that they will complain to the City or to the University. 
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IF THEY WANT TO KNOW THE CHANCES OF AN EARTHQUAKE HERE 
 
Tell them that southern Illinois has had earthquakes in the past and can expect them in the 
future.  Southern Illinois, and nearby parts of Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, and 
Arkansas, are all near the New Madrid seismic zone, an active earthquake region.  It is 
highly likely (more likely than not) that a Magnitude 6 earthquake could occur 
somewhere in this region within the next 20 to 50 years.  Such an earthquake could cause 
severe damage to towns near where it occurs, and lesser damage over a wide area. 
 
General Guidelines 
 
At least one photograph of the front must be taken of all buildings surveyed. Preferably, 
you should take two photographs, each one showing portions of two sides of the building 
(take the two photos from opposite corne rs of the building). 
 
Take time to check the forms for accuracy and completeness.  The information on the 
form must appear to be in agreement with the building in the photo. 
 
If a structure has two or more significant parts with a different construction type for each 
part, divide the structure into separate facilities using the construction type as the guide. 
 
Provide a plan-view sketch of the floor level of each building.  This will be located in the 
grid portion of the Data Collection Form, if there is sufficient space; or on another sheet 
of paper if necessary.  Each sketch should include accurate dimensions of the floor 
shown, a north arrow, side A (front address side) labeled, and other adjacent buildings if 
they affect the surveyed building.  If a large building is broken into parts, a key plan must 
be included to show how the parts fit together; this key plan should be included with the 
Data Collection Form for each part.  The sketch can be done freehand, as long as it is 
readable and to scale. 
 
Numerical street addresses must be provided for all facilities.  In addition, provide the 
nearest cross street.  We will also use the GPS to provide latitude and longitude, to the 
nearest second.  You might want to take three or four measurements at each site, and then 
average them, to improve measurement accuracy. 
 
Data Entry 
 
Enter all data into an Excel spreadsheet, using the same columns and format as the 
spreadsheet from IEMA, of which you have a copy. 
 
Attached is a detailed description of all the data categories, copied directly from IEMA=s 
field guide (last revised 7/98). 
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APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE ATC-21 FIELD DATA FORM 
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APPENDIX C 
EXCERPT FROM 1985 NEHRP Aa MAP (BSSC, 1985) 
(Basis of three seismicity hazard areas in ATC-21) 
 
 
 
 
Carbondale 
 
Sikeston 
